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This essay discusses the corporate governance of banks. Bank managers must
balance  competing  demands  from  shareholders  and  regulators,  which
distinguishes banks from most other firms. The essay is structured into three
parts.  The  theoretical  section  first  broadly  defines  management  and  its
governance as a process with certain built-in ambiguities that defy a strict
notion of accountability. Then, a focus on financial stakeholders clarifies the
different governance objectives of owners and creditors, and integrates bank
regulation into the concept of debt governance. The empirical section surveys
the extant literature to derive insights as to which theoretical predictions have
so far received more wide-spread support, and in which areas the insights
generated by researchers may still be too vague to lend themselves as a basis
for policy advice. The third section then spells out a recommendation for
a logically consistent regime in which shareholders (equity governance) and
regulators (debt governance) can meaningfully coexist in their quest to guide
and constrain bank managers.
JEL classification: G21, G28, G34
Keywords: banks, bank regulation, corporate governanceExecutive Summary
Bank  managers  live  in  a more  complex  environment  than  their  peers  in
industry due to bank regulation. In addition to the demands placed on them
by shareholders, regulators have strong incentives to influence managerial
action, and this may be in conflict with shareholder demands. Who receives
priority in such situations? How should the banking firm be governed? This
paper  seeks  to  address  these  issues  in  light  of  the  vast  theoretical  and
empirical literature in the respective scientific areas.
Chapter one serves to lay the theoretical groundwork by motivating general
insights on management and governance in general, where it is shown that
management appointment and replacement are procedures that defy the usual
standards  of  optimality  as  employed  in  economics,  and  that  therefore  also
‘governance’is a rather crude institution to improve performance. Nonetheless,
it is demonstrated that governance interests for debt and equity are different, and
some  conditions  for  coexistence  of  the  two  interests  are  derived.  Equity
governance  takes  precedence  in  good  times,  but  is  overridden  by  debt
governance interests in times of distress. Debt governance – through its focus on
the poor states – also seeks to avoid risk shifts. Bank regulation is then defined
as a special case of debt governance, and the illiquidity of bank loans is seen as
a pivotal  feature  of  the  banking  firm  to  motivate  discretionary  governance
standards also for bank creditors rather than merely contractual safeguards.
After  the  theoretical  introduction,  chapter  two  surveys  the  only  loosely
connected streams in the empirical literature of the corporate governance of
banks, and bank regulation. The former emphasizes the shareholder manager
conflict and performance issues, while the latter appropriately concentrates on
the issue of institution risk. Very few studies at this point have addressed the
mutual desire to command the attention of bank management. The literature
survey is conducted to extract insights of particular relevance for policy makers.
The third chapter is then reserved to assess the body of knowledge in light of
the  quoted  literature  to  draft  an  internally  consistent  regime  of  bank
governance that adequately addresses the concerns of both shareholders and
regulators.  The regime proposed here draws on two major themes:
bringing more debt governance instincts to market participants, and
introducing more access and control of regulators to the governance
infrastructure typically reserved for shareholders.I.  Debt  governance  for  market  participants,  shareholders  and
management
a) Instead of government run deposit insurance, government accreditation of
privately organized deposit insurance is recommended as a ‘first line of
defense’ primarily  against  individual  institution  failure.  The  private
schemes are ideally organized as mutuals owned by participating banks in
order to increase incentives for mutual monitoring.
b) Private deposit insurance schemes in many countries will face the problem
that  few  large  banks  account  for  the  lion’s share  of  insured  deposits.
I recommend that the 100 to 200 largest banks in the world mutually
organize an international deposit insurance fund under the auspices of
national regulators as well as the BIS in a process not unlike the current
debate over Basle II.
c) The call in the recent literature for the issuance of uninsured subordinated
debt by banks is supported, yet not as a mandatory requirement, but by
way  of  a regulatory  framework  that  allows  banks  to  self-select  into
different regimes. A mandatory requirement risks the contract between
bank and regulator to be rendered incomplete when the market would not
accept an issue by some bank.
d) Small banks, that are unlikely to tap capital markets in the near future are
encouraged to organize a new or join an existing system of small banks
structured around a large clearinghouse in the center. The clearinghouse
bank  provides  liquidity  to  the  member  banks  and  obtains  substantial
governance  rights  in  return.  To  the  regulator,  this  represents
a decentralization  of  debt  governance,  and  is  rewarded  with  a more
‘lenient’ regulatory regime similar to that provided for banks that issue
uninsured subordinated debt. Again, banks self-select into a regulatory
regime.
e) The conflict of interest between shareholders and depositors of a bank can
be mitigated by making sure that everyone is both. This is the advantage of
cooperatives. I argue that the survival of the cooperative form in banking is
so  much  more  pronounced  than  in  other  industries,  because  financial
cooperatives address the specific governance dilemma faced by banks.
Weakening shareholder instincts seems to be an advantage for the overall
performance of banks. However, I do not advocate special support for
financial mutuals, but rather call for regulators looking favorably on the
cooperatives instead of fighting them for a presumed governance deficit.
f) I join the call by Macey and O’Hara to also transplant creditor interests to
the  managerial  level  by  extending  the  concept  of  fiduciary  duty  to
depositors.II.  Regulators and shareholder governance
1. Preventative measures (ex ante)
Regulators  must  have  the  ability  to  prevent  arrangements  between  bank
shareholders  and  their  managers  that  needlessly  accentuate  rather  than
attenuate conflicts of interest with regulators. The following elements may be
contemplated:
a) Ownership restrictions. Unadulterated equity interests can lead to perverse
incentives due to the call option feature of equity. The aggressive pursuit
of  shareholder  value  concerns  can  lead  to  incentives  to  ‘gamble  for
resurrection’. Therefore, the most suitable ownership form next to the
cooperative for a bank is widely held ownership. Any concentrated form
of ownership will more likely turn against regulatory interest in times of
distress. To avoid this, ownership restrictions may be desirable from the
point  of  view  of  regulators.  This  holds  particularly  for  management
ownership shares that are large in percentage terms relative to the banks
total capital, but also the manager’s total wealth. Due to the sensitivity of
ownership regulation in a market economy, an alternative to ownership
restrictions would be a more aggressive regulatory regime for banks with
concentrated ownership. From a social welfare point of view, what has
been said about the cooperative form is true about ownership structure: the
reduction of shareholder vigilance is to some extent positive in banks.
b) Management  compensation  contracts.  Also  the  contract  between
shareholder and management can lead to excessive incentives to take on
risks. In the mainstream corporate governance literature, it is accepted that
managerial risk-aversion represents a potential agency problem between
shareholders, who are only interested in market risk, and managers, who
are interested in firm-specific risk. Management remuneration contracts
specifying  performance-based  awards  should  stretch  the  cash  flows
associated with these awards over time in order to make sure that failed
gamble for resurrection strategies are not rewarded. Regulators, who in
many countries get to have a say in bank management nominations in the
first place, should also be able to ratify payment terms.2. Protective measures (ex post)
a) Access to the board of directors: I claim in the paper that bank regulation
shares  characteristics  with  debt  governance  as  for  example  practiced
between German banks and large firms, where bankers often have a board
mandate to step in during times of financial distress. Regulators should not
have  a permanent  board  mandate,  but  in  times  of  deteriorating  bank
quality,  they  should  be  in  a position  to  ratify  shareholder  initiated
restructuring proposals after checking for risk compatibility. This would
be akin to the role of creditors in Chapter 11 or out-of-court restructurings.
b) At  the  beginning  signs  of  trouble,  regulators  should  also  be  able  to
propose, later mandate, financial institution mergers to decentralize the
restructuring process if necessary.
Finally, I argue that Charter Value is viewed positively by both shareholders
and regulators. While bank regulation should not attempt to create charter
value, it may contemplate to reward it.Contents
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Regulatory  reform  of  financial  sectors  around  the  world  has  triggered
a dialectic  process  of  adaptation  of  financial  institutions  and  regulatory
responses in a quest for more efficient financial intermediation. The current
negotiating process surrounding “Basle II”
1 bears witness to the complexities
regulators face in a shifting environment. Possibly more compelling than the
challenges to the regulators, however, are the managerial efforts of reshaping
their institutions in an environment of technological change, globalization,
and regulatory reform
2.
This paper addresses the issue of competing demands placed on managers of
financial  institutions  by  owners,  who  are  interested  in  efficiency,  and
regulators, who focus on ‘prudence’. This paper views regulation as a part of
an overall corporate governance regime of banks. Governance, in turn, deals
with the process of mandating some form of accountability from managers.
Thus, this study puts (bank) management at the center of the inquiry.
However, economic theory has so far yielded only few insights as to what
managers do exactly, and why they are necessary in the first place
3. Thus, in
the first chapter I develop a framework that may fill some gaps in economists’
understandings of management. Under the conceptual lens
4 employed there,
authority  relations  arise  endogenously  as  an  efficiency  adaptation  to
a communication problem in group decision-making. Yet, even though the
authoritative  office  (the  management  position)  may  be  desirable,  the
personnel  question  on  leadership  and  leadership  succession  remains
ambiguous, and defies traditional optimality criteria.
This  characteristic  of  management  influences  the  nature  of  governance,
which  has  to  be  a rather  vague  concept.  In  particular,  I will  define  the
governance incentives of debt and equity investors in a firm, and demonstrate
that the governance policy applied by investors will also defy the application
of stringent optimality criteria. While the governance incentives of debt and
11
1 E.g. Karacadag and Taylor (2000) for a discussion of the proposals.
2 Llewellyn (1999).
3 Radner (1992).
4 The conceptual lens most similar to the one followed throughout this paper that has been
applied to the problem of bank regulation and governance is found in Sarcinelli (1997).equity investors are different to some degree, their governance policies will
share many characteristics, and are best summarized as satisficing behavior in
the sense of Herbert Simon (1978).
The general ideas on governance – especially debt governance – are then
applied  to  the  principles  of  bank  regulation  and  supervision  to  yield
a theoretical framework that merges thoughts on corporate governance and
bank regulation into a unified body that defines an overall governance regime.
However,  the  vagueness  of  the  “governance”  concept  defies  attempts  at
optimizing the regime by fine-tuning its components. Rather, success should
be defined as installing an internally consistent regime, in which the
individual components would complement rather than contradict each
other.
Chapter two will discuss the available empirical literature on the governance
and regulation of the banking firm to establish what we know about the
governance of financial firms at this point. This will provide guidance as to
which  elements  of  the  governance  and  regulation  of  banks  are  less
controversial, and thereby lend themselves better for the shaping of policy
recommendations.
Chapter three uses the previously developed theories as well as empirical
insights to propose an internally consistent regime for the governance and
regulation  of  banks.  Major  elements  of  the  proposed  regime  are:  a self-
selection mechanism of regulatory regimes for different banks; more reliance
on  mutual  monitoring  among  large  as  well  as  small  banks;  regulatory
authority over equity governance mechanisms prone to accentuate rather than
limit  the  conflict  of  interest  between  debt  and  equity;  and  access  for
regulators  to  the  governance  infrastructure  of  banks  with  deteriorating
financial conditions. The last chapter serves to summarize and conclude.
One  caveat  regarding  the  applicability  of  the  proposed  regime  has  to  be
mentioned here: the cornerstone of the arguments regarding bank regulation
is that the public choice mechanism in a democracy endows regulators with
a mandate to defend depositor interests. Thus, the regulatory mandate in weak
democracies or outright dictatorships may respond to a very different set of
incentives
5. This, in turn, would question the wisdom of a governance regime
of banks that is structured around a properly incentivized regulator. Apolitical
12 Introduction
5 Charap and Harm (2000).regime less connected to the electorate would also imply the possibility of
questionable  incentives  given  to  government  owned  banks,  which  are
prevalent in the developing world
6, but not very successful
7.
Also, the often rather concentrated ownership structure found in developing
countries
8 may extend to privately owned banks
9, which – next to the obvious
problem  of  ‘connected  lending’ –  is  likely  to  accentuate  the  governance
conflict between shareholders and regulators, as I will argue further below. If
in  addition  the  economic  elite  is  well-connected  to  the  political  elite  of
a country,  possibly  because  it  is  part  of  a ‘crony  capitalism’ patronage
network as described by Charap and Harm (2000), then the issue of regulatory
capture almost becomes a foregone conclusion.
Then, for all countries, which suffer weak political institutions in combination
with  government  or  very  concentrated  private  ownership  of  banks,  the
suggestions derived in this paper are less applicable. In all likelihood, policy
makers in such an environment will have a much more constrained choice set,
and the optimal decisions in that environment may deviate largely from the
recommendations developed here.
To be sure, problems of influence peddling, regulatory capture, and various
forms  of  corruption  including  monetary  rewards  or  future  employment
promises  are  not  unheard  of  in  countries  with  more  solid  democratic
institutions. Yet, this paper abstracts from political economy problems, and
considers  regulators  to  be  properly  incentivized  through  a democratic
mechanism.  It  proposes  an  ‘ideal  form’ for  a governance  and  regulatory
regime for financial institutions in functioning democracies.
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6 E.g.: Caprio and Levine (2002).
7 LaPorta et al. (2002).
8 See Claessens et al. (2000) for documentation of concentrated ownership in East Asia.
9 Caprio and Levine (2002).1 Theoretical Perspectives on Management, Governance,
and Finance
1.1 A theory of management
Zingales (2000) called for a better understanding of the firm, and authority
relations within the firm, to improve our knowledge of the nature of the
relationship between the firm and the providers of its financial resources. This
chapter addresses precisely this concern.
To be sure, there exists an economic theory of the firm
10. When opportunistic
and boundedly rational agents contemplate relationship-specific investments,
ex ante vertical integration represents a solution to ex post renegotiation and
appropriation of quasi-rents. Yet, the solution is driven by the pooling of
residual claims, which eliminates the incentives for renegotiation efforts
11.
The necessity for – and nature of – the authority relationship between human
actors is left indeterminate.
In  this  chapter,  I will  derive  the  necessity  for  the  authority  relationship
through recourse to another problem: imperfect communication in mutual
decision-making situations. It is – of course – of central importance to assume
that a group of people finds itself in a task where joint action is perceived to
yield larger gains than solitary labor.
1.1.1 Subjective knowledge and communication costs
In the following, I will sketch a model of man, in which subjectively held
beliefs  are  highly  idiosyncratic,  and  communication  can  only  imperfectly
align agents’ ‘views of the world’. Moreover, these ‘views of the world’ are
sticky, and two individuals can see their contradicting beliefs confirmed
12 by
observing the same event.
15
10 Coase (1937), Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1985).
11 Alchian and Demsetz (1972), and Holmstrøm (1982).
12 In terms of a simple hypothesis test, this would be trivial in that beliefs are not rejected by
the same evidence observed by actors with different beliefs. ‘Confirmation’ here stands for the
possibility that agents with contradicting beliefs would have expected the observed event.A thus defined belief structure retains the problems associated with
asymmetrically distributed information and contract incompleteness due
to bounded rationality, but adds an additional layer of complexity
through the introduction of communication costs.
1.1.2 The problem of group decision-making
With communication costs, group decision-making represents a non-trivial
problem. Compare the situation developed by Alchian and Demsetz (1972).
There, all participants in a group effort know and agree on the theoretically
optimal actions, but are side-tracked by a shirking externality when individual
contributions to social output are not perfectly measurable. In the following,
I wish  to  abstract  from  the  shirking  problem,  and  derive  a necessity  for
authority structures due to communications costs alone.
1.1.2.1 Consensus
In  a world,  where  agents  hold  heterogeneous  and  mutually  contradictive
beliefs, honest disagreement will result in a group decision-making impasse.
In the best situation, agents can debate the issue sufficiently to learn from
each other, revise their ‘views of the world’, and generate a decision superior
to what each individual could have achieved. However, such learning process
may take time, which renders two cost implications: the normal opportunity
costs of time, but also the possibility that the group finds itself in a dynamic
equilibrium  of  continuously  diminishing  welfare.  It  may  be  better  to  ‘go
somewhere’ rather than ‘going nowhere’.
A less  beneficial  outcome  of  the  group  decision-making  process  is  that
individuals achieve a bargained compromise that is not internally consistent
13.
Such  a ‘foul  compromise’ may  be  worse  than  decisions  rendered  by  an
individual, but may nevertheless be suitable to end a downward spiraling
process: it may be a preferable decision, but it may not be ‘first-best’.
Finally, the group can establish ‘irreconcilable differences’, and no decision
is  taken,  which  destroys  the  assumed  gains  that  had  brought  the  group
together in the first place. Thus, the consensus procedure always entails the
16 Theoretical Perspectives on Management, Governance, and Finance
13 Similarities  to  parliamentary  decision-making  procedures  in  democracies  are  not  co-
incidental, but intended.costs  associated  with  time,  and  may  in  addition  yield  inferior  bargained
compromises.
1.1.2.2 Authority
If the costs associated with time, inferior bargained compromises, or group
dissolution are perceived significant enough, an authority position may be
superior:  a leader  performs  the  task  of  economic  planning  not  only  for
himself, but for everyone in the group inasmuch as decisions of relevance to
the group are contemplated
14.
Yet, the authority position is created due to the problems of disagreement,
which will continue to exist after the position is created. Therefore, the holder
of an authoritative office must be endowed with power to ensure that his or
her decisions are obeyed.
This,  in  turn,  leads  to  contradictions  when  leadership  succession  is
contemplated. If the outcome of the group effort is judged ‘inferior’ by the
group, but cannot be uniquely attributed to the leader’s (wrong?) decisions, the
question  of  leadership  termination  becomes  indeterminate.  Inasmuch  as
disagreement is invoked for the leadership position exante, it is invoked against
the leader expost. Icall this the ‘fundamental paradox’of all authority positions:
there is no clear-cut answer, as to when there is ‘enough’disagreement with the
leader to motivate leadership succession. Note, that at this point I have not
invoked the concept of opportunism, but only ‘honest disagreement’.
In a sense, the management definition favored here is compatible with the
notion of a ‘Schumpeterian entrepreneur’. There, the idiosyncratic knowledge
of the entrepreneur lies at the core of his success. Creative destruction always
carries the notion of implementation of actions that had not been conceived
of by anyone before. Barriers to efficient communication would achieve such
distribution of information.
In  this  regime,  the  question  of  award  and  termination  of  a management
position  defies  standard  optimality  criteria.  By  its  very  definition,  the
management position is clouded by a certain vagueness and ambiguity: is
dissent  evidence  for  the  necessity  of  the  management  position,  or  is  it
evidence against the holder of the position? When standards for management
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14 This arguably comes closest to the concept of management as defined by Coase (1937).succession are vague, the power that the management office is endowed with
leads to a certain stickiness of the position. On the other hand, the often
hostile  arguments  invoked  against  management  in  an  agency  theoretic
framework  may  be  exaggerating,  since  honest  disagreement  can  be
a substitute explanation for phenomena typically attributed to opportunism
15.
1.1.2.3 Autonomy
Yet, the stickiness inherent in authoritative office does tie group members to
potentially fallible leaders. It is then mandatory for society to restrict the reign
of authoritative offices, and leave the exit option open for group members
16.
Hayek  (1945)  argued  that  the  market  gave  incentives  to  individuals  with
superior ‘knowledge of time and place’ to contribute to social welfare by
translating such knowledge into monetary gains. I maintain that this is equally
true  for  his  ‘knowledge  of  general  principles’. The  exit  option  maintains
a welfare enhancing marketplace of ideas. The pluralistic society is not just
a moral good, it is also practical.
1.1.2.4 Opportunistic authority
If we now add the assumption of opportunism to the leadership problem, the
inherent contradictions in authoritative offices are merely accentuated, but not
fundamentally changed. Aleader can misuse the necessary power the office is
endowed  with  in  an  opportunistic  sense.  Then,  it  becomes  even  more
necessary to settle the question of management succession ex ante
17. Yet, the
challengers  of  a leader  may  themselves  be  opportunistically  motivated
18,
which in turn enhances the need for power in the authoritative office. The
introduction  of  opportunism  provides  additional  arguments  against  the
holders of authoritative offices, but doesn’t change the ex ante desirability of
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15 Witness the analysis by Franks and Mayer (1996), where they interpret the UK takeover
evidence as differing ex ante expectations between management teams rather than ex post failure
of one.
16 The problem is illustrated by the success of Ross Perot’s EDS in the USA, and SAPsoftware
company in Germany. Both companies tie their origins to the fact that the founders were rebuffed
by their former IBM employers with the idea that IBM should enter the software market. They
subsequently chose to exit IBM, and develop their ideas into rather profitable businesses.
17 Arrow (1974) concludes his essay on ‘The Limits of Organization’ with the observation:
“Authority is undoubtedly necessary for the achievement of an organization’s goals, but it will
have to be responsible either to some form of constitutionally planned review and exposure or to
irregular and fluctuating tides of disobedience.”
18 A relevant part of the wider governance literature would be Pound (1991), who described
that one reason the SEC tried to monopolize all communication between investors, management,
and potential challengers was because of self-interested challenges to management from outsiders.the  office  itself:  also  ‘strategic  bargaining  behavior’ in  the  consensus
procedure may be opportunistically motivated, which introduces additional
costs on that regime.
1.2 Governance and Finance: debt vs. equity
Governance  of  the  firm  represents  the  institutions  that  select,  motivate,
control, and dismiss managers. With this definition, governance institutions
bear the brunt of the ambiguities inherent in leadership positions, which calls
the existence of an optimal governance regime into doubt. In the following,
I will  derive  the  governance incentives inherent  in  equity  and  debt
investments, and verify the limitations of governance policy.
In the following, I will reintegrate the assumption of opportunism into the
analysis, and argue first of all in the spirit of Transactions Cost Economics or
incomplete  contracting  theory,  since  I maintain  that  the  assumptions  on
economic  agents  sketched  above  encompass  potential  for  ex post
renegotiation. While Williamson (1988) assumes certain governance structures
associated with debt and equity, I will here try to derive them using his logic.
First of all, however, one could ask why the providers of financial resources
are  the  relevant  group  to  associate  with  corporate  governance.  Zingales
(2000) further develops an argument by Welch (1997) that residual control
should  rest  with  the  most  powerful  group  in  order  to  minimize  ex post
conflict.  In  firms,  where  human  capital  is  the  key  contribution  to  the
production process, this group may well be employees and managers. Yet, as
Zingales shows at the example of Saatchi and Saatchi, such firms should have
problems raising external capital. Thus, we will focus here on firms with
significant needs for external funds.
Then, the providers of financial resources have arguably committed the most
specific  asset  to  the  production  process. Workers  can  take  much  of  their
human capital to the next employer, while financial contributions are almost
entirely expropriable by ill-spirited management. Investors would thus face
the  most  severe  problems  of  renegotiation.  With  that,  governance  policy
emerges  endogenously  from  the  structure  of  financial  contracts.  Thus,
a number of arguments presented below are compatible with similar thoughts
voiced in the incomplete contracting literature
19.
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19 Zender (1991), Aghion and Bolton (1992), or Dewatripont and Tirole (1994).Here, I will motivate the governance rights of investors dependent on the cash
flow  characteristics  of  the  returns  they  negotiate:  profit  share  or  fixed
remuneration.
1.2.1 Equity
The typical starting point is a situation where there are only entrepreneurs
without cash, and investors without ideas. If the two meet, let us assume that
the investor negotiates a profit share as a return on investment. This investor
has a theoretical stake in the quality of even marginal managerial decisions,
since the return is immediately influenced. At the same time, the manager has
the potential to expropriate wealth from the investor as a consequence of an
incomplete contracting environment. I will focus on small and large firms in
turn.
1.2.1.1 Equity investments in small firms
Investor and entrepreneur first need to negotiate, what kind of contract should
define their relationship. The reputation-only solution in an equilibrium as
described by Klein and Leffler (1981) is here deemed too fragile, as the
experience  with  sovereign  debt  suggests
20.  Binding  the  management  into
a detailed  state-contingent  long-term  contract  principally  violates  the
assumption of a Schumpeterian entrepreneur, and is feasible only for well-
structured projects that need little management discretion
21.
Then, an investment contract must contain elements of hierarchy: the right to
dismiss  the  manager  or  liquidate  the  project,  which  essentially  defines
a transfer of property rights. This contract lowers the expropriable quasi-rent
of the investor from the full; amount of the investment to the lower value
between the costs of finding a replacement manager or liquidating the assets
of the firm. The investor would also ask for substantial control rights to
activate the dismissal or liquidation options if necessary.
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the 1980’s. Sachs (1982) gives an account of default and renegotiation of Guatemalan debt in the
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21 Such  financial  arrangements  have  been  described  by  Destais  (2000),  who  discusses
contractual solutions in project finance even though asset specificity is high.Yet,  in  small  firms,  managers  themselves  may  have  returns  on  private
information to protect. There is, thus, a case of double-sided moral hazard
22:
the manager can expropriate the investor’s wealth, while the investor can
expropriate the manager’s private information. If also the entrepreneur must
fear expropriation, the ideal contract is not obvious: the right of dismissal can
be used in an opportunistic way; an extensive control right can be used to
construe situations that warrant dismissal. With double-sided moral hazard,
there is an increased likelihood of complete transaction failure.
If  the  manager  has  no  significant  returns  to  private  information,  the
performance of the contract still depends crucially on the investor’s ability to
adequately  monitor  the  manager.  Inability  in  this  regard  increases  the
likelihood of unnecessary dismissal or liquidation when honest disagreement
is mistaken for opportunistic behavior. In this situation, the introduction of
a board as a monitoring specialist is only of value inasmuch the investor
believes that it is more difficult for two people to collude to expropriate him.
The ultimate dismissal or liquidation right must lie with the investor, and also
disagreement with the board can be mistaken for opportunism. Increasingly
bounded investor rationality leads to an increased likelihood of transaction
failure.
1.2.1.2 Equity investments in the widely held corporation
In the widely held corporation, a board as a specialist monitoring institution
serves  an  additional  function  to  overcome  the  consensus  problem  with
a multitude of shareholders and the monitoring externality. Yet, upon closer
look, the efficient governance policy within the board is all but clear. Fama
and Jensen (1983) separate the decision-making process into initiation and
implementation as decision management, and ratification and monitoring as
decision control. If a board refuses to ratify proposals because it may have
‘better  ideas’,  or  if  it  continuously  uses  ‘monitoring’ to  enforce  ‘better’
implementation, then the board will effectively have become management.
The distinction by Fama and Jensen is not as clear-cut. Also Arrow (1974)
noticed that activist oversight is far from solving the accountability problem:
it is merely pushed one layer back.
I call  this  the  fundamental  paradox  of  supervision:  too  much  activism
contradicts the principle of delegation. Then, the board has no option other
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22 Aghion and Tirole (1994).than engaging in ‘enlightened self-restraint’: only become activist when some
performance threshold is not met, else refrain from action. Yet, as described
above,  the  point  at  which  there  is  ‘too  much  disagreement’ and  a leader
should be dismissed is somewhat arbitrary. If we acknowledge that there are
costs associated with recurring management transition, the threshold level to
trigger boardroom activism must be set such to balance the (elusive) costs of
leaving presumably inefficient management in place against the costs of too
frequent management changes. Then, corporate governance policy represents
satisficing behavior as defined by Herbert Simon (1978).
The equity investor in small entrepreneurial firms or large corporations is
never in a position to engage in overly activist behavior. In the small firm
where  managers  can  themselves  be  expropriated,  a contract  allowing  too
much investor control will not be acceptable to the entrepreneur. In the large
corporation, the definition of the board should be such as to limit overly
active behavior. Notably, the German Aktiengesetz stipulates that members of
the supervisory board should only engage in ‘supervisory’ activity, while
operating decisions are left to management. Yet, in keeping with the above
analysis, the Law cannot provide a detailed distinction, where supervisory
activity  ends,  and  active  management  begins. Also  observers  of  the  US
system have noted the ambiguities inherent in boardroom supervision: “We
don’t know what directors are supposed to do; we only know that they have
to do it ‘with care’
23.”
As a final thought on the governance of the large firm, let us return to the
notion voiced by Fama and Jensen (1983) and assume that the management
of the large firm is merely ‘governing’ lower levels of management in the
firm. The ambiguities in defining a more appropriate role for ‘governance’are
then  accentuated  by  recognizing  that  top  management  is  already  the
institution chosen to govern the firm on a full-time basis: a further argument
in favor of management autonomy and governance restraint.
1.2.2 Debt
So far I have argued that equity governance requires some monitoring ability
of  the  investor.  In  the  following,  I claim  that  debt  can  be  a solution  to
transaction  failure  motivated  by  bounded  investor  rationality.  Negotiating
22 Theoretical Perspectives on Management, Governance, and Finance
23 Manning (1984), as quoted by Johnson, Daily and Ellstrand (1996).a fixed payment – the cash flow characteristic of debt – in return for the
investment can solve the problem for such investors, since they care less
about  every  marginal  decision.  Managerial  decisions  are  judged  only
inasmuch they increase the likelihood of the project’s pay-offs falling below
the  promised  fixed  return  rather  than  a directly  linear  relation.  This  has
important consequences for the feasibility of the contractual solution.
1.2.2.1 The contingent contracting solution
The larger the (positive) difference between expected investment return
on the project and the investor’s fixed income promise, the less he will
care about the manager’s decisions. Hence, there is a potentially significant
reduction  in  the  scope  of  the  necessary  contract  space  to  prevent
expropriation:  it  may  suffice  to  address  only  basic  conflicts  of  interest
between  project  manager  and  investor.  This  may  be  more  desirable  than
a transfer  of  property  rights  with  its  requirements  for  decision  control
capability of the investor, costly monitoring structures, or the problem of
reverse  expropriation.  Next  to  providing  benefits  of  risk-sharing,  debt
economizes on monitoring costs.  The  problem  of  bounded  rationality
leading  to  a failure  of  the  contractual  solution  has  been  reduced.  Yet,
a contract doesn’t completely solve the problem. The closer debt comes to
non-performance, the more the incentives of the fixed income investor will
overlap with those of the profit sharing investor, and the investor will start
caring again about every marginal management decision.
1.2.2.2 A contingent transfer of property rights
A mechanism for the transfer of control and/or property rights is needed. If
the payment promise is unlikely to be met, the investor faces essentially
a situation of a profit sharing investment, as he will get all surplus, since it is
insufficient to compensate for the promised amount. By the arguments made
above, he now needs a governance structure identified with profit sharing,
and that implies a transfer of property rights.
Bankruptcies may serve as an example of the concept. Property rights of firms
not  capable  of  meeting  their  debt  obligations  are  transferred  to  the  debt
owners. In the intermediary step (e.g. US Chapter 11), management must seek
creditor  approval  for  restructuring  plans.  Prior  to  the  ultimate  transfer  of
property rights, fixed income claimants only assume the function of decision
control  akin  to  a temporary  transfer  of  property  rights.  Only  if  the
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liquidation (US Chapter 7).
As long as the probability of meeting the contractual payment obligation is
high, the need for decision control from the investor is minimal, and contracts
specifying behavioral restrictions that cover basic conflicts of interests may
be  preferable  to  a profit  sharing  agreement  for  the  boundedly  rational
investor. As fulfillment of the payment obligation becomes less likely, the
incentives of the fixed income investor become aligned with those of the
profit sharing investor, and he will demand decision control, or a complete
transfer of property rights
24. This governance structure cannot eliminate the
whole problem of appropriable quasi-rents, as the fixed income investors may
have to assume decision control, or face the costs of replacing management
or liquidation. Yet, the ex ante expected monitoring requirements are lower
for the debt investor than for the equity investor.
1.2.3 Debt versus equity
We can now compare the governance structures of debt and equity from the
point of view of a boundedly rational investor:
The less capable the investor is in decision management or decision control,
the more likely it is that the governance structure of profit sharing will be too
expensive or infeasible, and the fixed income payoff will be preferable.
This is the more true, the higher the returns to the entrepreneur’s private
information.
The less capable the investor is in decision control, the greater the disparity
between the expected return on investment and the fixed claim’s return that
would  make  the  investor  indifferent  between  the  two.  Lesser  qualified
investors have to be satisfied with lesser fixed returns, because the lower the
probability of returns not being sufficient to satisfy the fixed income claim,
the higher the probability to be called to perform costly decision control.
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Zender (1991), Aghion and Bolton (1992), or Dewatripont and Tirole (1994).The more boundedly rational the investor, the more likely debt will be chosen
over equity, and the lower the interest rate that will satisfy the investor. The cash
flow characteristics of debt can be interpreted as asatisfactory return, rather than
the maximal return of a successful equity investment. Hence, the choice of debt
over equity can be seen in complete analogy of Herbert Simon’s(1978) concept
of satisficing. Debt can be viewed as a “satisficing claim”
25, and is chosen as
an alternative to equity for boundedly rational investors.
1.2.4 Contractual safeguards of debt
In  a long-term  investment,  the  debt  investor  will  need  interim  reports
informing him about the safety of his payment promise to determine whether
he is already sufficiently close to a situation requiring decision control. Yet,
bounded rationality and a limited understanding of the business process make
this more difficult. Three potential solutions come to mind.
First, the investor can require an independent auditor to deliver reports on the
firm’s situation in regular intervals. Such an auditor is partially equivalent to
the board of directors as a monitoring institution for equity investors. The
debt contract does not need to stipulate the right to evaluate – and potentially
dismiss – the manager. The equity contract does, and the board fulfills that
function for equity investors
26.
Secondly, the investor can demand continuing fixed payments over the life of
the project rather than one big payoff at the end in order to check the status
by observing the ability to make the interim fixed payments. The converse
implies  that  if  these  interim  payments  cannot  be  met,  we  demand  either
a situation of decision control (Chapter 11) or transfer of property rights
(Chapter  7).  Debt contracts would specify frequent interest payments for
governance reasons alone.
Third, loans can be secured by pledging assets. For an investor incapable of
meaningfully performing the function of decision control, but who specifies
a contract  that  demands  a transfer  of  property  rights  in  case  of  non-
performance, this transfer may be a non-credible threat. Out of the three
options available to the fixed income investor at that time of non-performance
–  managing  the  project  himself,  hiring  a new  manager  and  performing
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25 See also Hax (1988) for this view of the debt contract.
26 Benston (1982) argues that auditing information is too coarse to evaluate managers.decision control, or liquidating the project – the last one is least affected by
the debt investor’s bounded rationality. Hence, the debt investor’s only true
safeguard will be the liquidation value of the assets he financed. Then, the
debt contract only needs to provide for the contingent transfer of property
rights to assets rather than the whole firm. Debt is more likely to be chosen,
the less firm-specific the assets financed, i.e. the higher their value in uses
outside  the  investment  project
27.  For  boundedly  rational  investors,  the
firm’s credit ceiling is defined by the liquidation value of assets.
1.2.5 Bankruptcy Law
Collateral can also be seen as a device to keep assets out of bankruptcy
proceedings. Yet, ex ante there is no reason why the contingent transfer of
property rights necessary for debt claims should be governed by Law rather
than private ordering
28. Aghion, Hart, and Moore (1994) motivate the legal
bankruptcy mechanism with reference to a problem akin to a bank-run: value
is destroyed by every creditor trying to beat the line, which requires a transfer
of the process to a single authority. In line with the arguments made above,
I argue that a heterogeneous group of creditors has a consensus problem, and
the  Law  imposes  an  authoritarian  regime  through  the  imposition  of  an
impartial  leader  such  as  a judge  (US  Chapter  11),  or  a bankruptcy
administrator (German or French bankruptcy Codes).
Another  possibility  is  that  the  Law  increases  the  negotiating  power  of
creditors  to  enforce  the  transfer  clause  of  the  debt  contract.  Because  of
bankruptcy  laws  we  observe  negotiated  debt  work-outs,  which  might  not
happen  otherwise  due  to  contract  incompleteness  and  renegotiation.
Unambiguous bankruptcy triggers establish a credible floor to the utility of
managers, which induces them to negotiate with creditors. Creditors in turn
prefer work-outs to the presumably rigid procedures of statutory Law. In the
spirit  of  sequential  equilibria  as  defined  by  Kreps  and  Wilson  (1982a),
bankruptcy Law is necessary to increase the value of the work-out solution
for creditors, or make such work-outs possible in the first place. Yet, with
a rigid and costly statutory Law structure in place, creditors have an incentive
to collateralize their assets ex ante to keep them out of bankruptcy.
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28 Easterbrook (1988) pointed out that bankruptcy Law and private work-outs are substitutes.
Gilson,  Lang  and  John  (1988)  provide  evidence  that  the  choice  of  regime  for  financial
restructuring can be predicted by the markets.1.2.6 The governance policy of debt and equity investors
Collateralized  debt  minimizes  the  appropriable  quasi-rent  inherent  in  any
investment.  The  minimal  monitoring  requirements  of  debt  may  have  led
Charles Dunbar (1929, p.1) to say the following about banks and their services:
Absent  collateral,  also  the  debt  owner  will  improve  his  position  through
monitoring ability. This is reflected in Josef Schumpeter’s (1939, p.116)
29
view of the role of banks.
Yet, even if creditors have a monitoring role, the governance policy of debt
claims  will  resemble  that  of  equity,  albeit  for  different  reasons:  debt  has
reduced interest to monitor; equity – pushed by its incentives – exposes the
paradox of delegation and supervision. Debt and equity governance share the
characteristic  of  monitors  being  inactive  as  long  as  firm  performance  is
satisfactory, and stepping in when some threshold is crossed. For debt owners,
the threshold is defined by their required debt service. For equity owners the
threshold is defined by shareholders’ return or profit expectations. But both
efficiently remain inactive as long as performance is satisfactory. Hence,
corporate  governance  policy always  represents  “satisficing”  rather  than
“optimizing” behavior
30.
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29 Requoted from Diamond (1984).
30 Coming from an incomplete contracting perspective, Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) reach
similar conclusions about the governance conduct of regulators, which I am going to address
below.
“The wants which banks satisfy are of a simple kind ... moreover, the transactions by
which these wants are satisfied are as simple as the wants themselves, and are speedily
reduced to such routine as to lead Adam Smith to rate ‘the banking trade’as one of the
few which could be brought to such uniformity of method as to be safely conducted by
a joint-stock company.”
“... the banker must not only know what the transaction is he is asked to finance and
how it is likely to turn out but he must also know the customer, his business and even
his private habits, and get, by ‘frequently talking things over with him’, a clear picture
of  the  situation.  ...  traditions  and  standards  may  be  absent  to  such  a degree  that
practically anyone can drift into the banking business, find customers, and deal with
them according to his own ideas. ... This in itself ... is sufficient to turn the history of
capitalist evolution into a history of catastrophes.”To be sure, the equilibrium solution must entail that equity owners’threshold
for board activity is higher than debt owners’ threshold, else there would be
no  incentive  to  hold  riskier  equity. Yet,  the  symmetry  in  the  governance
structures of outside debt and outside equity makes differences in governance
policy a matter of degree rather than a matter of principle. This is illustrated
in Figure 1, where the thin horizontal line represents the intervention level of
equity investors, while the stronger horizontal line that of creditors.
Figure 1: Hypothetical Performance Chart, and Intervention Levels of Debt and
Equity
The erratic line is supposed to resemble some performance measure such as
a stock price. Equity investors would intervene in management decisions
more often. The graph also illustrates why creditor boards are said to allow
management a more long-term focus. If we treat the performance measure as
a stochastic process, it is well known that the expected time to a boundary
increases with the distance from the current position, all other things equal.
Staying  with  a stochastic  process  interpretation,  governance  monitoring
would  also  become  more  vigilant  as  management  alters  the  terms  of  the
process to increase the likelihood of hitting a boundary, i.e. the well-known
phenomenon of risk shifting. Due to the much discussed externality of debt,
which does not participate in the upside of risk-shifting, debt governance
would mandate a monitoring role to prevent adverse risk shifts.
Overall, however, due to the satisficing nature of governance, authority for
day-to-day  operations  rests  with  management.  The  Schumpeterian
entrepreneur  does  not  allow  comprehensive  decision  control  in  order  to
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firm is not constrained in this way, but the fundamental conflicts inherent in
all supervisory activity leads to restraint in the boardroom. Debt investors
lack  motivation  for  close  supervision  most  of  the  time,  and  are  mostly
concerned with risk shifts. Managerial entrenchment follows logically from
our theoretical analysis of the management relationship.
These  insights  can  be  compared  to  observed  boardroom  behavior.  The
accusation  of  complacent  boards  is  nothing  peculiar  to  any  system  of
corporate governance. The charge has been issued by Redlich (1968, p. 378)
for the US during Financial Capitalism, Roe (1994, pp. 9-12) for the US
today, Schaede (1993) for Japan, and Edwards and Fischer (1994, p. 151) for
Germany. Yet, corporate restructurings are observed in all systems. Also, the
board is increasingly viewed as a consulting device for management
31.
Vafeas (1999) documents that the frequency of board meetings in US firms
increases with deteriorating performance as measured by share price declines,
and that operating performance improves in the years following increased
board activity. Similarly, Warner, Watts and Wruck (1988) find that poor stock
price performance can predict management turnover, but the logit regressions
have no predictive ability outside extreme performance experiences. Both
results are consistent with my hypothesis that boards become active only after
a threshold has been passed.
The above analysis of debt and equity contracts also adds to the study of the
determinants of a firm’s capital structure: bounded rationality and an inability
to perform a meaningful monitoring function is added to the list of taxes,
bankruptcy costs, agency costs, and the attempt to minimize renegotiation
problems  between  investor  and  manager.  We  arrive  at  a “pecking-order
theory”  similar  to  that  of  Myers  (1984),  but  in  the  sense  of  a maturing
process: an entrepreneur will finance his investments with internal funds first
before  turning  to  external  debt.  Only  after  the  firm’s debt  capacity  is
exhausted will the owner seek outside equity participations – or compromise
growth for complete control.
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(1992).1.3 Towards banking and relationship banking
Having derived efficient governance policies for debt and equity, I can now
analyze some salient features of banking and “relationship banking”. My
concern here will not be to analyze why banks emerge as a separate form of
institutions that act as a financial intermediary
32, but why it is that banks
administer debt instead of equity contracts, and why they might nonetheless
participate in the governance of the corporations they finance.
1.3.1 Why banks administer debt contracts
Debt economizes on investor rationality, especially when secured by non-
specific asset values. This limits concern with governance issues. As long as
the assets financed are salvageable with little loss to the creditors, all business
finance looks alike. With that, a single loan officer can develop the skills to
administer loans to clients across a variety of industries and – due to their
simplicity – debt contracts can reap economies of scale.
Not so the equity contract. Even though also equity governance is guided by
satisficing principles, the board has to be knowledgeable about the trade the
respective firm engages in to evaluate managers. With that, the scope of an
“equity officer” (instead of “loan-officer”) is going to be narrower. Training
of  such  individuals  cannot  resort  to  universal  principles,  but  is  more
idiosyncratic. Thus, there is also less reason for organizations to emerge that
unite different “equity officers”, since the gains from communication between
them are limited. Economies of scale to administer equity contracts are lower
than for debt contracts.
There are some indications for the validity of this principle. Active investors
such as Robert Icahn focus on only asmall number of businesses, and rarely join
efforts. Headquarters of conglomerates perform the function of administering
an internal capital market among a variety of unrelated businesses,
33 and thus
represent the equivalent of an “equity officer”. The number of subsidiaries in
such conglomerates is typically smaller than the number of accounts managed
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32 Both Diamond (1984) and Boyd and Prescott (1986) develop models where diversification
allows  banks  to  write  incentive-compatible  contracts  superior  to  those  that  undiversified
individuals can offer. Yet, their models are driven by the Law of large numbers, and thus provide
only a partial understanding of the banking firm.
33 See Williamson (1981) for this argument.by a loan officer in a bank, and conglomerates are now deemed unsuccessful,
precisely because of the limits to governance expertise
34.
The experiment of “equity banks” has also been conducted in countries trying to
implement the principles of Islamic Banking
35. Acursory glance at that experience
shows that banks operating in that system do their utmost to subvert interest rate
prohibition. Klein (1982) made similar arguments with respect to the canonical
interest prohibition in the Middle Ages, where the Church itself violated the
principle of interest prohibition. Mutual funds are not a counter example to this
thesis since they are largely free-riding on an existing governance infrastructure.
Financial  intermediaries  administer  debt  claims,  because  equity  contracts
imply  diseconomies  of  scale:  there  are  no  (or  fewer)  universal  rules  of
boardroom conduct. The efforts by institutional investors such as CALPERS
are aimed more at establishing a governance regime rather than conducting
active oversight. Still, their evidence on their value impact is mixed
36. The
debt contract – especially when supported by collateral – can achieve greater
standardization and thereby economies of scale.
1.3.2 A governance role for banks: creditor-led work-outs
Is there a case to be made for a role of banks in corporate governance?
Inasmuch as loans are not covered by collateral, or the assets purchased are
highly  specific  to  the  firms  and  are  not  easily  salvageable,  banks  could
principally gain from governance knowledge when loans are non-performing.
However, for the same reason that “equity banks” were rejected as not viable
above, a general role for banks as boardroom activists is unlikely. A more
detailed analysis is in order. Above, I derived three aspects of the property
rights an investor needs to defend his interests in an investment project:
a) The right to liquidate the project
b) The right to replace the manager
c) The right to engage in decision control
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34 Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990), Bhide (1990), Lichtenberg (1992), Comment and
Jarrell (1995), Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995a, 1995b), Servaes (1996), Lins and
Servaes (1999).
35 Iqbal and Mirakhor (1987), Khan and Mirakhor (1989).
36 Nesbitt (1994) and Smith (1996) find positive performance effects in CalPERS activism.
Karpoff, Malatesta and Walking (1996), Wahal (1996), Duggal and Millar (1999), and Faccio and
Lasfer (2000) find no performance increases due to institutional investors’ activism.In the order listed, these rights require an increasing knowledge of operations.
For the case of satisfactory performance, decision control covering issues of
direct conflicts of interest between manager and investor may suffice. In the
case  of  debt  non-performance,  decision  control  has  to  deal  with  the
substantive issues of the firm. It is this kind of boardroom activism that makes
“equity  banks”  infeasible,  and  is  therefore  also  outside  the  scope  of
a diversified bank.
The replacement of managers is a function that can potentially be performed
by bankers. It requires, however, that the manager is more an administrator
than  a Schumpeterian  entrepreneur.  This  restriction  principally  rules  out
a meaningful  participation  of  banks  in  the  governance  of  small,
entrepreneurial firms. It does, however, allow for a (reduced) role in the large
enterprise.  Banks  represented  on  corporate  board  can  be  expected  to  be
primarily active in managerial selection. Their central role in the economy
allows them to make a market for top managers.
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Banks’role in managerial selection can also be explained by looking at the
liquidation motive. In a large enterprise, liquidation of isolated assets may
eradicate still existing going concern values. In an illiquid market for large
business  units,  the  downsizing  process  may  need  active  and  skillful
management to realize going concern values. When loans are in threat
of non-performance, selecting a manager experienced at downsizing to sell
off parts of the firm in order to repay loans can be a natural role for
creditors.
In that sense, the right for managerial selection is an extension of a broader
defined liquidation motive. Yet, managerial selection is a right belonging to
owners, and banks would have to wait until ownership is transferred to them
in a bankruptcy situation. Given the rigidities of the legal process, this may
not be feasible in a crisis situation. The motivation for banks to seek a board
seat is simply to have a contingency role in governance and – if necessary
managerial selection – in crisis situations. During normal times, the role of
a banker on a company’s board is negligible.
Redlich’s (1968, p.378) gives an account of the board activities of the bankers
in  the  USA during  ‘Financial  Capitalism’:  “The  only  positive  aspect  of
control was very often the selection of chief executive and perhaps other
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37 See also Baums (1994) for this point of view.leading officers ... once the right men were in and as long as they ran the
enterprise in question ... with profit, the investment banker in control did
absolutely nothing.” Sheard (1994) shows that bankers in Japan only enter
boards  during  crisis  situations.  Edwards  and  Fischer  (1994)  lament  the
passivity of German banks in corporate boards, while Harm (1997) shows an
active engagement in large firm restructurings. Banks’ governance motives
are  driven  by  the  illiquidity  of  corporate  assets.  Only  when  the  lending
engagement  exceeds  collateral  value  banks  will  have  an  incentive  to
participate in corporate governance. Conversely, an ability of banks to reduce
losses  in  corporate  crises  due  to  governance  skills  extends  firms’ debt
capacities beyond collateral value, thereby contributing to deeper financial
intermediation and economic growth.
1.4 The banking firm
1.4.1 The traditional view of banking and its regulation
Based  on  the  dictum  of  efficient  markets,  the  Finance  literature  never
had an easy  approach  to  banking.  Fama  (1980,  1985)  observed  that
something must be special about banks, since bank loans command higher
rates  than  those  on  commercial  papers  of  comparable  risk.  Thus,  the
conventional  wisdom  emerged  to  view  banks  as  institutions  generating
private information about borrowers, which would leave their assets (loans)
relatively  illiquid,  since  the  information  would  not  be  credibly
communicable due to the lemons’problem. Abreakthrough was achieved by
Diamond and Dybvig (1983), who argued that demandable debt such as
deposits coupled with illiquid loans mandated deposit insurance in order to
avert  unfounded  bank  runs,  an  argument  also  proposed  by  Woodward
(1988). Under this view, all banks are at all times illiquid and solvent, and
needless bank runs could spread contagiously to other banking institutions,
ultimately  triggering  a credit  crunch  that  would  impose  great  costs  on
society at large.
This negative externality could be avoided through deposit insurance. The
problem is only that deposit insurance, if it is not correctly priced according to
the asset risk of each institution, would lead to moral hazard problems between
bank management and the providers of the deposit insurance guarantee, since
the benefits of asset risk can be enjoyed without the corresponding costs of
liabilities, and the potential costs of increased asset risk are born by the deposit
insurers. This asset shift to a riskier portfolio may then counter the original
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38. Calomiris (1999, p.1499) summarizes that “bank safety
nets, originally proposed as a means of stabilizing financial systems, have
become an important destabilizing influence”.
At the very least, the moral hazard problem necessitates bank regulation and
supervision  in  order  to  counter  the  lack  of  market  discipline  with  public
authority. In order to guarantee aminimum of bank safety, regulators prescribe
minimum capital levels, which should be determined on the basis of asset risk
of the financial institution as well. Also, the right (and practice) of regulators
to close inefficient financial institutions (defined as institutions at the point of
insolvency) serves to restore managerial incentives for prudence. Conversely,
managerial expectations of forbearance could invite risk seeking strategies.
1.4.2 Bank regulation as debt governance
Given the above, it might not be an exaggeration to argue that the cornerstone
of modern theories of the banking firm is the illiquidity of assets. Important
for the governance of the banking firm is that the illiquidity of bank assets
makes them unsuitable to serve as collateral to bank creditors. Bank creditors
are thus natural candidates to perform debt governance as defined above: they
would  be  interested  in  a role  in  corporate  governance  to  effect  ‘orderly
liquidation’ of a potentially delinquent bank. The illiquidity of bank assets
could result in large losses if they were simply sold. On the other side, the
restructuring of a delinquent bank under new management could retain the
knowledge pool available in bank employees and borrower files, and yield
a higher return to the creditors of the bank.
The  main  presumption  here  is  that  when  bank  assets  are  illiquid,  bank
restructuring is almost always preferable to bank asset liquidation. Then, the
above analysis on debt governance suggests that also creditors of the banking
firm have a natural governance interest.
Some 60% of US commercial banks’total liabilities are deposits
39. In Europe,
the magnitude of deposits in total bank liabilities is similar. Of those deposits,
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38 An often overlooked point in such arguments against deposit insurance is that perverse
incentives to shift asset risk also exist if depositors in hypothetical uninsured banks would not
appropriately price their claims to reflect bank risk.
39 Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.8: Assets and Liabilities of Commercial Banks in the
United States; http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H8/data.htma significant proportion is provided by the populace at large. Within this
clientele, however, the expertise to monitor bank managers is likely to be
nominal. Yet, other institutions with larger – or even junior – debt claims on
the bank balance sheet may be numerous enough to suffer from an externality
problem. Then,  the  principal  governance  interest  of  bank  creditors  is  not
translated into reality: small depositors cannot perform the function, large
depositors and creditors may find it still less than worth their while.
One possible solution to this governance dilemma of bank creditors is to seek
a board mandate for a creditor representative. If, however, there are legal
obstacles to enter a board of directors as a creditor representative, a second
option  would  be  to  employ  the  public  choice  mechanism  and  hire  bank
oversight in the interest of bank creditors. Since the problem is equally true for
all banks, ageneral oversight mechanism over the banking sector in the interest
of  depositors  may  just  be  a natural  outcome  of  a political  process  in
a democracy. This institution can both develop the necessary expertise, as well
as overcome the monitoring externality faced by the totality of depositors.
Generally, the notion to be portrayed here is not to replace a previously held
view on the motives for bank regulation
40. Rather, the objective is to add to
the existing literature by drawing inferences starting from a model of man that
is capable of reserving a distinct role for management, which is the object of
governance. Conclusions reached at this point are that
a) bank  regulation  may  emerge  through  the  public  choice  mechanism
motivated  by  a (debt)  governance  interest  common  to  all  depositors
(voters?) to overcome monitoring insufficiencies and externalities.
b) bank regulation is governed by the principles of debt governance, which –
among others – imply threshold-driven activism
41.
c) the resolution of financial distress at banks should – if at all possible – take
the form of restructuring rather than asset liquidation.
1.4.3 Shareholders’ and Regulators’ Roles in Bank Governance
Given the existence of governance interests on the side of both equity and
debt investors in the bank, the objective here must be to find a way, in which
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40 See Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (1998) for an excellent survey on the topic.
41 Multiple thresholds such as Prompt Corrective Action triggered by CAMEL ratings in the
US would be a refinement rather than a contradiction of the principle espoused here.the legitimate interests of the two constituencies can meaningfully co-exist.
Can  existing  regimes  be  of  any  guidance  to  assess  the  roles  the  two
governance philosophies?
Under the conceptual lens developed in this paper, the role German banks
take in the governance of large German industrial firms
42, or that Japanese
banks take with respect to keiretsu firms
43 should be viewed as evidence of
debt governance
44. For this view to apply, it is immaterial whether bankers
have a permanent place on a company’s board, as is customary in many of
Germany’s large enterprises, or if they don’t, as Japanese keiretsu banks.
Important is that they assume an active role in enterprise restructurings once
the viability of their exposure is threatened.
An unfortunate by-product of the German and Japanese style of large industry
governance  lies  in  the  deficits  to  shareholder  interests.  The  question  is
whether such shortcomings lie in the nature of debt governance, or whether
they can be avoided
45. Under the governance policy principles developed
above, the governance priority should first of all lie with shareholders: any
firm showing signs of trouble should first of all be steered back to a course of
virtue in the long-term interest of shareholders. The only true conflict of
interest arises with respect to the issue of risk: equity owners – especially in
financially distressed firms – have incentives to ‘gamble for resurrection’,
while debt owners have every incentive to avoid precisely that. No creditors,
however, would object to strategic shifts that assure or solidify the long-run
viability of the firm.
Thus,  also  for  banks  showing  the  first  signs  of  trouble,  a meaningful
restructuring plan should be developed by the board of directors in the long-
run  interest  of  shareholders. Yet,  a crucial  difference  between  banks  and
industrial firms is that substantial risk-shifts in banks are easier to camouflage
and thus harder to detect. Therefore, it is mandatory that regulators receive
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42 Harm (1992a).
43 Sheard (1994).
44 Interestingly, Skeel (1999) finds similarities between the governance of industrial firms in
Germany and Japan, and banks and insurance companies in the USA. This style of governance is
labeled as “ex ante”, while governance of US industrials is labeled “ex post”. He does not,
however, link these governance styles to the governance incentives of debt or equity claims.
45 Visentini (1997) examined Italian bank governance from a legal perspective to note that –
also due to regulation – bank management is largely removed from shareholders. He defines bank
supervision similar to a board of directors for creditor interests (Visentini (1997), p. 175).notice from boards of directors when restructurings are contemplated, and
that they accompany the process, but with limited authority. Such authority is
geared  exclusively  at  making  sure  that  there  are  no  adverse  risk-shifts
undertaken by management. In the USA, such a policy might be triggered by
a number 3 CAMEL or BOPEC rating.
Obviously, the notion of bank risk lies at the heart of most studies of bank
regulation. A question, however, may be whether incentives for risk-shifting
emanate from the deposit insurance regime, or whether they more simply
reflect innate differences between debt and equity. While the former remains
a possibility, this paper is focusing on the latter effect. In this spirit, a number
of  recent  studies  have  focused  on  finding  mechanisms,  by  which  bank
managers are incentivized to internalize depositor interests. Looking at direct
downside incentives of management, Macey and O’Hara (2001) have called
for the fiduciary duty of bank directors to extend to depositors, and that bank
directors should not be able to eliminate their personal liabilities in duty-of-
care cases (p. 13).
Noe,  Rebello  and  Wall  (1996)  provide  an  early  attempt  to  include
management  compensation  contracts  into  an  analysis  of  shareholder  and
regulator  policy  towards  banks.  They  reason  that  shareholder  designed
incentive contracts exacerbate the risk shifting incentives of bank managers.
Ang, Lauterbach and Schreiber (2001), however, argue that bank regulations
can  reduce  the  amount  of  incentive  pay  granted  to  executives.  Recently,
Osano (2002) has argued that stock option incentives for banks managers may
stand in the way of achieving socially optimal allocations in bank bail-outs.
The most comprehensive model was developed by John, Saunders and Senbet
(2000),  who  reasoned  that  managers  should  receive  both  an  aggressive
performance  related  bonus,  which  is  capped  at  some  level,  as  well  as
a fraction  of  the  bank’s shares
46.  In  this  way,  the  evaluation  function  of
managers has a significant concave section, re-introducing risk-aversion to
management behavior. The authors show that in case the FDIC premium is
priced  fairly  taking  into  account  the  elements  of  the  pay  schedule,  then
shareholders  would  offer  precisely  this  pay  schedule  to  managers,  and
managers would make first-best investment-risk decisions. The issue that the
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46 See also Goodhart et al. (1998, p.48) for a discussion of a typical management evaluation
function. More generally, people are usually characterized by concave utility functions. Then, any
pay schedule rising linearly with performance would be evaluated more conservatively the more
remote the chance of bankruptcy.deposit insurance premium actually charged must incorporate parameters of
the management pay schedule would limit the applicability of this concept,
but  it  represents  almost  a first  attempt  in  the  literature  to  define  bank
governance by tying shareholder and regulator interests together.
Also the issue of bank ownership has been explored in this context. Ciancanelli
and Reyes-Gonzales (2000) focus on the risk-externality of equity to identify
bank owners as the dominant force of incentives against regulatory interests.
Thus, they not only advocate against significant management ownership shares
or higher pay-performance sensitivities for bank managers, but also in favor of
regulation  actively  constraining  or  superseding  ownership  interests.
Tonveronachi  (1997)  contemplates  the  introduction  of  the  government  as
a‘prudential shareholder’in banks, but immediately inserts the caveat that this
would likely complicate matters since it would likely involve the creation of
another agency with possibly questionable effectiveness, or even motives
47.
Yet, one ownership solution to the conflicts of interest between debt and
equity can already be found in many banking systems: cooperative banks, in
which  every  depositor  is  a shareholder. This  structure  alleviates  conflicts
between debt and equity investors at the shareholder and board level. The
cooperative form is not very popular in the economy at large. In banking,
however,  incentive  conflicts  between  owners  and  depositors  are  reduced,
making this organizational form more desirable. Of course, banks cannot be
ordered to become cooperatives. Like all other institutions, cooperatives must
stand the test of the marketplace and compete successfully. However, calls for
the  abolition  of  the  cooperative  form  due  to  a lack  of  (takeover)  market
discipline – as has been demanded in the UK occasionally – are equally
misguided
48.
In the end, shareholder value maximization was never intended to stand for
the  complete  disregard  of  all  other  interested  parties
49.  Accordingly,  no
shareholder value proponent would argue that it is the job of managers to
identify externalities and loopholes. These are to some extent evidence of
contract incompleteness, which represents an undesirable friction in social
life. In the purist corporate governance ideal, shareholders are the ones having
discretionary control over the management process, since they stand the most
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47 Banks may, for example, have a better lobby to effect regulatory forbearance.
48 See Llewellyn and Holmes (1991) for this argument.
49 See Jensen’s (2001) concept of “enlightened value maximization”.to  lose. All  other  stakeholders  contract  with  management  to  defend  their
legitimate interest in the firm. In a world of incomplete contracting, this
representation of final recourse to management only through the court system
may be inefficient. We have derived above that control transfers to creditors
in  financial  distress  situations  are  efficient.  In  banks  such  problems  are
magnified, and the governance regime must find a way of accommodating
representatives of both shareholders and depositors.
Such  a ‘peaceful  coexistence’ between  shareholder  representatives  and
regulators would be consistent with the postulate formulated by Ciancanelli
and  Reyes-Gonzales  (2000),  who  claim  that  institutions  of  shareholder
governance  should  recognize  regulators  as  an  external  force  limiting  the
degrees of freedom of bank policy relative to industrial firms. Also Llewellyn
and  Sinha  (2000)  recognize  that  bank  regulation  constrains  various
dimensions  typically  associated  with  shareholder  governance  such  as
ownership  structure  and  identity,  but  also  management.  Prowse  (1997b)
showed for the US that also there, regulators limit ownership structure of
a bank, and thereby large shareholder monitoring, or the takeover market.
Thus, Llewellyn (2000) calls for the banking firm to be viewed as embedded
in a multi-dimensional governance regime. He views the true challenge in
establishing a governance regime of banks as sensibly combining the various
governance and regulatory mechanisms
50.
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50 That  such  a  complex  systems  design  cannot  resort  to  ‘cherry  picking’,  but  has  to  be
structured as a coherent whole was already observed by Tonveronachi (1997).2. Bank managers between shareholders and regulators:
the empirical evidence
After having sketched some theoretical considerations on the governance of
banks, it is now time to analyze the empirical evidence to gain insights as to
the potential validity of some of the claims made above, and especially to
assess  which  insights  would  belong  to  a more  substantiated  ‘body  of
knowledge’, which may lend itself better as a basis for policy prescription. To
be  sure,  there  already  exists  an  excellent  survey  on  the  topic  of  bank
regulation and corporate governance by Prowse (1997b). The objective here
would be to bring the survey up to date to the year 2002, but also to interpret
the literature in the light of the theoretical views developed in the first chapter,
namely the governance incentives of debt and equity.
In fact, there seem to be essentially two sides to this literature, which deal
largely with the differing objectives of debt and equity: risk and performance.
Thus,  the  first  section,  which  summarizes  papers  relating  corporate
governance issues to the performance of banks, identifies the “equity strand”
of the literature. The second section looks at papers that are interested in the
behavior towards risk of banks, and thus represents the “debt” or “regulation
strand” of the literature. Since the first chapter didn’t give a survey of the
theoretical literature, but rather developed largely one theoretical viewpoint
under a consistent ‘view of man’, the discussions below will fill in theoretical
points developed in the relevant body of literature where appropriate.
2.1 Bank managers and shareholders
During the last two decades, the Corporate Finance literature has witnessed
a booming  interest  in  the  governance  of  the  firm  and  its  financial
implications. The first part of the literature can be labeled the “incentive” part,
where  the  role  of  takeover  markets,  management  share  ownership,  or
management remuneration contracts are identified as possible determinants of
management accountability and firm performance. The second part can be
labeled the “control” part, since it focuses on direct and indirect mechanisms
by which control is exerted over managements. These may include proxy
fights,  issues  of  ownership  structure,  or  issues  surrounding  the  board  of
directors.
41In the last ten to fifteen years, the general interest in firm governance has also
spilled over to the banking literature, which will be discussed in this section.
One surprising element of the discussion of this part of the literature will be
how  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  special  element  of  banking  as
a regulated industry. One may get the impression that the banking industry
may have been picked solely as a sample of firms within which general
notions of governance could be tested in a more cohesive laboratory. Issues
of  banks  as  regulated  industries  have  rarely  been  raised  in  the  papers
discussed below.
The subsequent survey on the empirical literature of the agency problem
between  bank  shareholders  with  their  managers  should  merely  serve  as
a reference point to be related later on to issues concerning bank regulation.
2.1.1 Expense preference
The  first  recognition  of  an  agency  problem  between  shareholders  and
managers  of  banks  was  developed  in  the  literature  under  the  heading  of
“expense preference theory”. While it was still deemed reasonable to assume
that firms in general would follow a course of profit maximization
51, this
behavioral assumption would not necessarily be true in regulated industries
since the profit objective would be compromised by regulatory interests –
a notion very much in keeping with the topic of this paper. Thus, managers
would  formulate  their  policies  not  to  maximize  profits,  but  “staff
expenditures, managerial emoluments, and discretionary profits”
52. Edwards
(1977) was the first to examine this notion empirically, and verify that the
hypothesis  of  expense  preference  behavior  was  better  supported  by
commercial  banking  data  than  the  hypothesis  of  profit  maximization.
Verbrugge and Jahera (1981) confirmed the same notion for US Savings and
Loans institutions. Prowse (1997b) has a more extended discussion of the
expense preference literature. For the purposes of this survey, the case has
been made that – perhaps more so than in industry – bank shareholders face
an  agency  problem  with  their  respective  managements.  This  calls  for
a discussion of the corporate governance of financial institutions.
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52 Edwards (1977).2.1.2 The market for control of financial institutions
Ever  since  Manne’ (1965)  insight  that  mergers  may  be  motivated  by
a corporate control change rather than seeking market dominance, takeover
markets have come to be seen as an at least potentially integral part of the
corporate governance regime in a country: managers that deliver substandard
performance have to stand trial in the market for management teams, which
spot firms with inferior performance, buy them, and steer the ship themselves
towards better performance, thereby increasing shareholder value
53.
Yet, there are a number of reasons for mergers that are not agency-related.
Already Manne (1965) pointed to the avoidance of bankruptcy in imperfect
capital markets, where the acquirer may preserve going concern value that
would be lost in bankruptcy or creditor-led distress restructurings. This may
be important in the restructuring of troubled industries
54. There may also be
tax reasons, although they would usually not be a primary motivation for
mergers. A shift in Antitrust policy, and deregulation efforts in general are an
important reason, especially in the case of banking. Finally, mergers may
simply be seen in the context of the theory of the firm
55: a changing market
environment requires organizational adaptation. Liquid capital markets may
then represent a conduit for change, be it through mergers or spin-offs. Thus,
rather  than  being  part  of  a disciplinary  device  to  ensure  managerial
accountability,  financial  markets  are  a conduit  for  the  market  for
organizational structures. Management represents an important part of such
organizational structures, but is not the sole focus of it.
The merger wave that has swept the US banking industry in the last two
decades then leaves only a potential corporate governance interpretation: that
the lifting of barriers to interstate banking has opened a long dormant market
for corporate control. This section serves to review the current state of the
literature  on  bank  mergers  and  their  potential  corporate  governance
interpretation. It will become clear that the evidence of – especially US –
bank mergers may carry only a slim governance interpretation. Thus, the
hurried reader may wish to skip through the following subsections, which
render a rather anti-climactic conclusion.
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53 Sharfstein (1988).
54 This is pointed out by Dutz (1989), Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), and Mitchell and
Mulherin (1996).
55 Coase (1937), Williamson (1985).2.1.2.1 Stock market gains
The early literature followed in the footsteps of Jensen and Ruback (1983),
who examined the wealth effects of merger activity in general to conclude
that mergers did generally create wealth, and that this wealth creation was to
be seen as an increase in shareholder value due to a more active market for
corporate  control.  Accordingly,  it  was  examined,  whether  bank  mergers
increased shareholder value. Here, Desai and Stover (1985) found that bidder
BHC’s experienced positive abnormal returns upon announcement as well as
approval of a merger bid. Yet, James and Weir (1987) find that some bidder
gains can be traced to the competitiveness of the bidding situation, which
somewhat weakens a corporate governance interpretation.
Trifts and Scanlon (1987) find that – as in merger evidence in general – target
shareholders gain, while bidders would merely break even. However, bidders
involved  in  large  acquisitions  earn  higher  returns  than  those  in  small
acquisitions. Skepticism of prudent bidder motives lies also in the study by
Dubofsky and Fraser (1989), who showed that two 1981 court rulings that
removed legal obstacles to future merger activity led to a decrease in the share
price of banks known as active acquirers. Evidence on takeovers has also
been generated in the Savings and Loans industry. Balbirer, Jud and Lindahl
(1992) trace merger gains in failed institutions to government subsidies. For
solvent institutions, Gupta, LeCompte and Misra (1997b) find that Pre- and
Post  FIRREA mergers  led  to  target  gains,  bidder  losses,  and  small
consolidated gains for the merged institutions.
More positively for the assessment of bidders, Cornett and De (1991a) find
that they generally earn abnormal returns, which they argue distinguishes the
record  in  banking  from  that  in  industry.  The  same  authors
56 also  find
a difference  to  non-financial  mergers  in  that  the  results  do  not  change
depending  on  whether  the  bidder  pays  with  cash  or  shares.  Cornett  and
Tehranian  (1992)  trace  the  stock  market  gains  to  various  performance
improvements after the merger. Contrary to their evidence, however, Houston
and Ryngaert (1994) find that large bank mergers generally do not lead to
statistically significant market gains. Only those mergers that promise gains
from market consolidation yield positive results.
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56 Cornett and De (1991b).Pilloff (1996) extends this line of work similar to Cornett and Tehranian
(1992) by using both market and accounting data to evaluate merger gains. He
finds  that  the  market  tends  to  value  mostly  those  mergers,  which  offer
potential for cost reduction (geographic overlap and high pre-merger expense
levels), while – surprisingly – market expectations turn out to be unrelated to
subsequent merger related gains. This is also consistent with DeLong’s (2001)
results, who finds that mergers focusing on activity and geography enhance
shareholder value, while diversifying mergers do not. Houston, James and
Ryngaert (2001) show similarly that management estimates of cost savings
are related to overall merger gains. Recently, Becher (2000) examines a much
larger data set than most other studies to show that bank mergers do lead to
overall stock market gains. Consistency with earlier mixed results on bidder
returns  is  achieved  by  recognizing  that  mergers  in  the  90’s were  more
successful than those of the 1980’s.
If there are gains in bank mergers, the Antitrust view would hold that they
would be due to a shift in the competitive balance of the overall market.
Following the analysis by Eckbo (1983) for mergers in general, Akhigbe and
Madura (1999) as well as Akhigbe and Martin (2000) find positive share price
effects on rival stocks upon a merger announcement. This would preclude an
Antitrust interpretation of the US bank merger experience.
Hostile transactions are a potentially clearer sign of the governance role of
takeovers. Baradwaj, Fraser and Furtado (1990) show that targets in hostile
bank takeovers earn higher returns than those in non-hostile transactions,
while  bidders  in  hostile  transactions  earn  negative  returns,  more  so  but
insignificantly different from those of non-hostile deals. At least the direction
of the latter piece of evidence supports the general claim on hostile merger
activity made by Comment and Schwert (1995) and Schwert (2000): that
target managers in hostile bids merely negotiate a higher price. The general
direction of the evidence presented by Baradwaj, Fraser and Furtado (1990)
is  compatible  with  Schwert’s (2000)  verdict,  while  not  being  statistically
significant:  it  neither  supports  nor  rejects  Schwert’s general  claim  that
hostility lies in the eye of the beholder.
2.1.2.2 Cost and Profit Efficiency
The literature examining the share price effects of mergers is complemented
by  the  literature  examining  bank  cost  or  profit  efficiency.  Shaffer  (1993)
argues  that  cost  savings  could  be  achieved  by  simulating  mergers  and
examining X-efficiency changes. However, Rhoades (1993) finds that bank
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though his sample was selected to include those mergers where efficiency
gains would have been most likely. His results are therefore consistent with
those  of  Peristiani  (1997):  the  1980’s mergers  do  not  yield  X-efficiency
improvements after the fact.
Both papers are mirrored in the above mentioned paper by Pilloff (1996): the
market ex ante hopes for efficiency gains, but firms may not deliver ex post.
An in-depths analysis of nine case studies of bank mergers leads Rhoades
(1998) to conclude that it was not possible to isolate the reasons for success
or  failure  in  improving  cost  efficiencies,  but  that  the  failed  firms  had
problems  integrating  data  processing  systems  and  operations,  hinting  at
a general problem with post-merger integration. Finally, Kohers, Huang and
Kohers (2000) find little relation between X-efficiency and merger related
abnormal  returns,  and  interpret  their  findings  in  favor  of  the  Inefficient
Management Hypothesis.
More  micro  evidence  has  lately  been  generated  by  Berger,  Leusner  and
Mingo (1997), who found that at one (exemplary) US bank there existed large
X-inefficiencies due to overbranching, but that these were not necessarily
associated  with  profit  inefficiencies  since  overbranching  raises  customer
convenience which may lead to additional revenues. Alternatively, Avery,
Bostic, Calem and Canner (1999) find that within-ZIP code mergers tend to
lead to a reduction of branch offices per capita in those ZIP code areas.
Competing  cost  or  profit  efficiency  motives  may  determine  actual  bank
policy, but the profit motive is more closely associated with shareholder value
maximization. Consistent with this view, the survey by Berger, Demsetz and
Strahan (1999) finds profit efficiency gains in the US bank consolidation
evidence, but little improvements in cost efficiency.
2.1.2.3 The governance interpretation of takeover restrictions
Another avenue of research has focused on the level of takeover activity
across States. Early evidence presented by James (1984) indicates that the
cost efficiency of banks in 5 states where corporate acquisitions of bank
stocks were restricted was below that of banks in 6 States with no such
restrictions. By the same token, Schranz (1993) finds that banks in active
takeover States are more profitable. While both studies support a positive role
for takeovers, they may have only limited corporate governance implications.
It is, for example, entirely plausible that State takeover restrictions have – at
least on an aggregate level – prevented (or made more difficult) efficiency
46 Bank managers between shareholders and regulators: the empirical evidenceadaptations  in  the  organization  of  financial  service  firms.  Management
resistance  to  advantageous  mergers  may  only  be  one  of  many  factors
explaining inferior performance in States disallowing bank takeovers.
The evidence contrasting states with and without takeover restrictions is put
in  perspective  when  contrasted  with  mergers  that  are  unlikely  to  carry
a corporate governance interpretation: those among credit unions or financial
mutuals. Fried, Lovell and Eeckaut (1999) found that there is significant
performance  variation  among  US  credit  unions  from  a cost  efficiency
perspective, leaving room for improvement and role models. Later, Fried,
Lovell and Yaisawarng (1999) examine targets of credit union mergers and
demonstrate that they improve performance after the fact. While these results
together would imply a governance deficit in credit unions and a positive role
for an active takeover market, the ownership structure of mutuals does not
allow such inference.
Thompson (1997), studying mergers among UK building societies in which
the mutual ownership equally discourages an active takeover market, finds
that  the  selection  of  targets  does  not  conform  to  typical  governance
predictions  of  poor  management,  but  is  likely  explained  by  regulatory
concerns for stability. In a separate analysis, Haynes and Thompson (1999)
verify  the  positive  performance  effects  of  building  society  mergers,
paralleling the US experience. 
Only for the Australian experience, Ralston, Wright and Garden (2001) find
no efficiency improvements in credit union mergers over and above those that
could have been achieved by internal growth. This is consistent with the
findings of Esho (2001) on Australian credit unions. In summary, however,
the evidence from credit unions in the USA, the UK, and Australia suggest
that efficiency improvements in mergers can be achieved without necessarily
carrying a governance interpretation. Accordingly, takeover restrictions may
not be equated automatically with a governance deficit.
Rather, it is worthwhile to keep in mind the hypothesis by Thompson (1997)
that at least in UK building societies, regulators may have been the driving
force between these mergers, not shareholders.
2.1.2.4 Diversifying Mergers
The above mentioned study by Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) had also
identified improved diversification of risks as one consequence of the recent
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diversification in commercial banks had long been lamented
57 in the literature.
For 38 S&L’s and 88 commercial banks, Fraser, Hooton, Kolari and Reising
(1997) find significant positive wealth effects related to key announcements
by the Office of Thrift Supervision in 1991 and 1992, to permit interstate
branching for federally chartered S&L’s. Carow and Heron (1998) examine
large BHC stock prices around the passage of the Interstate Banking and
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA), and postulate that this gain is due
to the market’s anticipation of control activities. Brook, Hendershott and Lee
(1998) estimate the value of the removal of such restrictions at $85 billion.
Accordingly, Benston, Hunter and Wall (1995) found that the recent merger
experience supported a motivation to diversify risks better than the alternative
to expand the deposit insurance put option. Similarly, this notion is supported
in the experience of the bank holding companies examined by Demsetz and
Strahan  (1997).  Microevidence  that  bank  holding  companies  use  their
structure  to  create  an  internal  capital  market  in  order  to  fully  exploit
diversification  benefits  is  presented  in  the  works  by  Houston,  James  and
Marcus (1997) and Houston and James (1998).
Hughes, Lang, Mester and Moon (1999) examine expected profits, profit risks
and profit efficiencies of interstate mergers to conclude that these transactions
diversify  macroeconomic  risks  of  financial  institutions,  and  thus  reduce
expected claims on society’s bank safety net. The latter conjecture, however,
stands in contrast to the conclusion by Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999)
that the bank consolidation wave of the recent past may potentially increase
systemic  risk.  The  argument,  however,  that  interstate  mergers  have  the
potential to improve on the risk structure of banks through diversification
remains strong. Is it a general merger motive?
2.1.2.5 The international evidence on bank mergers
As befits the international division of labor in academia generally, there are
but a few studies shedding light on the international experience with financial
institution  mergers,  and  their  possible  corporate  governance  role.  Vander
Vennet  (1996)  finds  that  domestic  mergers  among  equal  sized  credit
institutions in Europe significantly increases the performance of the merged
banks. Yet, counterproductive managerial motives such as size maximization
are also supported by his evidence.
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57 E.g. Woodward (1988).Examining  Italian  data,  Resti  (1998)  finds  that  buyers  appear  less  cost-
efficient than targets, which is consistent with much of the US evidence on
bidders. At the same time, the merged firm improves its efficiency, especially
when  they  operate  in  the  same  local  market.  This  supports  an  industry
consolidation interpretation similar to Pilloff (1996) or DeLong (2001) in
theUS.
Overall in Europe, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) find that – based on
announcement effects of bank mergers – those that take place in domestic
bank-to-bank  deals  or  in  banks  diversifying  into  insurance  increase
shareholder value, both for bidders and targets. They interpret their evidence
as ‘remarkably different’ from the US experience. Boot (1999) views the
mostly domestic consolidation experience in Europe as defensive and due to
political circumstances (creating European champions), which may not be
very relevant for the US, while the US geographic integration of financial
institutions may offer valuable insights for ‘imminent’ cross-border mergers
in Europe.
In Australia, Avkiran (1999) finds that – opposite to the Italian experience –
acquiring  banks  are  more  efficient  than  target  banks,  but  the  merged
institution  would  not  maintain  its  efficiency  after  the  merger  has  been
realized. Again, there may be a story of unfulfilled merger expectations as in
the US. For another regional experience, Altunbas, Liu, Molyneux and Seth
(2000) argue that – when quality and risk factors are appropriately accounted
for – scale-efficiencies for the largest Japanese banks suggest that they have
outgrown  normal  scale  efficiencies  and  should  shrink.  Kashyap  (1999)
summarizes his thoughts on merger policy in the US, Japan and Europe by
arguing that it should be driven by different considerations
58. In Europe, he
would follow Boot (1999) in arguing for setting the stage for productive
cross-border  mergers.  In  Japan,  foreign  capital  could  improve  on
undercapitalized domestic financial institutions. In the US, the current policy
of letting consolidation take its path should be continued.
2.1.2.6 Bank mergers and bank governance
The  different  country  experiences,  especially  as  (briefly)  compared  by
Kashyap (1999), render the verdict that mergers in different countries fulfill
different  purposes  in  different  situations.  Yet,  there  is  no  overwhelming
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58 This point is also belabored by Santomero (1999): regulators must react to their specific
situation in order to pass efficient legislation.evidence  that  bank  mergers  are  corporate  governance  driven
59. Whenever
governance problems are cited, they refer to indiscriminate buying on the side
of  the  acquirer,  not  substandard  performance  of  the  targets.  Targets  are
implicated  negatively  when  managers  resist  value-enhancing  mergers  for
selfish  reasons.  Yet,  the  evidence  on  hostile  deals  remains  mixed  and
ambivalent to interpretation.
Thus, so far there has been relatively little evidence on a distinct corporate
governance role in bank mergers. While there are benefits from mergers as
perceived  by  the  market,  these  may  not  necessarily  be  caused  by  poor
management. Cheng, Gup and Wall (1989) rejected that target banks had
exhibited  poor  performance  prior  to  their  merger,  but  concede  that  their
results may be due to the peculiarities of a regionally concentrated sample.
This  type  of  pattern  was  also  confirmed  for  UK  Building  Societies  by
Thompson (1997) as discussed above. On the other side, DeLong (2001) finds
that returns to bidders and targets increase with decreasing prior performance
of targets. Yet, here the same problem prevails that has been discussed before:
the  institutions  do  not  necessarily  deliver  on  the  cost  efficiency  gains
anticipated by the market. That target firms – even in hostile deals – do not
necessarily underperform the market has already been established by Franks
and Mayer (1996) for general merger experiences in the UK around 1986.
The banking industry – finding itself in an environment of deregulation –
takes the opportunity and restructures to consolidate in various geographic
regions  and  to  create  supra-regional  institutions  with  improved  risk
structures. There is an inconsistency in the findings in the literature regarding
mergers to focus versus mergers to diversify. While some earlier studies had
found their results consistent with the positive impact of cross-regional loan
portfolio diversification, especially the study by DeLong (2001) casts doubt
on  the  merits  of  regional  diversification  versus  geographic  consolidation.
However, the shortcoming of the latter study is that it exclusively examines
announcement gains, where earlier studies had shown that – while the market
may believe in cost savings – the merged firms may nonetheless not deliver
on these promises, possibly due to unrelated problems with the integration of
two institutions (Rhoades (1998)). This is consistent with the survey by Caves
(1989), which has shown for merger experiences in general that the presumed
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59 In Japan and some European countries, banking problems are systemic. Bank managers,
however,  can  only  be  held  accountable  for  their  own  firm.  Mergers  that  are  undertaken  to
consolidate  branch  networks  in  an  overbanked  area,  or  to  find  a  strong  partner  for  an
undercapitalized bank carry only limited corporate governance interpretations.gains from a transaction have often left the market eventually disappointed.
Caves  sees  takeovers  more  as  a problem  of  free  cash  flow
60 on  the
bidder’s side,  rather  than  a solution  to  a management  problem.  It  seems
intuitive to assume that banks would suffer a potentially greater problem of
free cash flow than industrial firms. The international evidence on bidder
performance in bank mergers is largely consistent with that view.
We can summarize the insights gained in this section with the following three
observations:
a) The  main  insight  yielded  by  the  evidence  presented  so  far  is  that  the
deregulation of the US financial services industry has created value, and
that one straightforward avenue at realizing this value was through either
focusing or diversifying mergers. Very little has been said up to this point
about management teams being incentivized by the threat of takeovers, or
being disciplined by the reality of takeovers.
b) Takeover  activity  may  often  be  motivated  by  reasons  other  than
shareholder value maximization. Takeovers may be the reflection of an
agency problem, not a solution to it.
c) The  notion  put  forward  by Thompson  (1997)  has  received  inadequate
attention  in  the  literature:  that  bank  mergers  may  be  demanded  by
regulators, who see in them a potentially cost efficient way of restructuring
institutions  in  an  ailing  industry.  We  have  come  full  circle  to  Manne
(1965): takeovers avoid costly bankruptcies in inefficient market settings.
No one has a bigger interest in having banks stay out of bankruptcies than
bank  regulators.  Especially  in  Europe,  where  past  regulation  in  many
countries had led banks that could not engage in price competition to
compete  on  quality  and  service  grounds  (e.g.:  over-branching),  the
liberalization  of  interest  rates  with  the  ensuing  decrease  of  interest
margins
61 has  left  at  times  the  entire  banking  industry  vulnerable.
Regulators  finding  themselves  in  this  situation  would  favor  industry
consolidation via mergers
62. At least part of the European evidence on
bank mergers must then be interpreted in the light of bank regulation rather
than the corporate governance of banks.
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60 Jensen (1986).
61 Dermine (1995).
62 As a related issue, Hotchkiss and Mooradian (1998) demonstrate the beneficial results of
restructuring firms in Chapter 11 by selling them to outside interested parties.2.1.3 Management ownership stakes
Another way of relating takeovers to corporate governance is to observe the
behavior of managers with different incentives – e.g. management ownership
stakes – in takeover situations. Allen and Cebenoyan (1991) find that bidder
returns of firms with high ownership stakes are positive, while others are not.
Looking at potential targets, the flipside of the coin becomes visible: Hadlock,
Houston  and  Ryngaert  (1999)  show  that  firms  with  higher  levels  of
management  ownership  are  less  likely  to  be  acquired,  which  points  at
management entrenchment.
Another  set  of  studies  examines  the  role  of  management  ownership
subscriptions in S&L’s converting from mutual to stock form. Carter and
Stover  (1991)  find  their  results  consistent  with  convergence  of  interests
between  managers  and  shareholders  for  low  levels  of  management
ownership, and entrenchment for higher levels of management ownership.
Also for converting thrifts, Boyle, Carter and Stover (1998) find that at low
levels of management ownership, ownership is negatively related to anti-
takeover  provision,  while  at  higher  levels  of  insider  ownership,  the
relationship  fades.  The  authors  equate  their  findings  with  insider
entrenchment. Aharony, Falk and Lin (1996) show that firm value and insider
ownership  in  mutual  to  stock  conversion  are  negatively  related,  which
similarly supports an entrenchment interpretation.
For commercial banks, Hirschey (1999) argues that a number of empirical
results regarding management ownership are actually due to size, since large
fraction of insider ownership are predominantly observed in small banks.
Nonetheless,  DeYoung,  Spong  and  Sullivan  (2001)  study  only  small
commercial banks to conclude that – once the decision to hire an outside
manager  has  been  made  –  success  depends  vitally  on  the  provision  of
incentives related to firm success, and that management ownership stakes are
an important element of such success.
In a nutshell, the articles examining ownership stakes of bank managers in
a corporate governance setting mirror the insights gained in the wider debate
over management ownership: Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) found both
incentive (at low levels of management ownership) as well as entrenchment
effects (at higher levels of management ownership). More recently, however,
Himmelberg,  Hubbard  and  Palia  (1999)  have  argued  that  management
ownership  is  an  endogenous  variable,  making  the  performance  effects  of
management ownership stakes much harder to identify.
52 Bank managers between shareholders and regulators: the empirical evidence2.1.4 Management compensation
Next to examining insider ownership, management compensation structure is an
obvious mechanism to align shareholder and manager interests. Hubbard and
Palia (1995) examine US states with and without takeover restrictions to find that
states permitting interstate banking feature banks that pay higher overall bank
CEO  remunerations  which  at  the  same  time  are  more  sensitive  to  bank
performance. They also observe higher CEO turnover in such States. They
interpret the results as consistent with amanagerial talent market thriving in aless
regulated environment. However, Ang, Lauterbach and Schreiber (2002) find
that the level of CEO remuneration as well as the pay-performance sensitivity are
influenced by bank size. Since banks in States with takeover restrictions should
usually be smaller, it is not clear what drives the results by Hubbard and Palia.
Bliss  and  Rosen  (2001)  examined  managers  of  acquiring  banks  enjoying
different levels of stock-based compensation to find that those with more
incentive related pay were less likely to engage in value reducing mergers. As
in Ang, Lauterbach and Schreiber (2002), the level of pay typically increased
in the merged institution. This result is also supported by Anderson, Becher
and  Campbell  (2001),  who  examine  compensation  changes  of  bank
CEO’s after  acquisitions,  and  demonstrate  that  compensations  packages
increase in total merger gains realized upon announcement, suggesting that
CEO compensation is related to (anticipated) productivity rather than size.
Similarly, Barro and Barro (1990) document in a non-merger related setting:
that growth in pay for bank executives equals growth in expected marginal
product, and that CEO pay is not shielded from aggregate risks. Also CEO
turnover is linked to performance, even at age 65.
Thus, the recent literature on compensation of bank CEO’s supports the notion
that the pay packages correctly incentivize bank managers. Only Hermalin and
Wallace (2001) show that CEO compensation contracts in S&L’s are complex,
and that they cannot easily be related to current compensation theories.
This literature on bank CEO compensation must be related to the literature on
CEO compensation in general, where a greater array of problems has been
unearthed  over  and  above  potential  incentive  alignment  effects.  In  that
literature, it has been argued that actual CEO compensation packages may not
address the problem they should solve
63, and that compensation packages lend
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63 Yermack  (1995)  finds  his  evidence  inconsistent  with  the  notion  that  actual  CEO  pay
packages are explained by agency considerations.themselves to ex post rent-seeking
64. Recently, Bebchuk, Fried and Walker
(2001) claim that CEO compensation structures observed in the US are better
explained by ex ante CEO rent-seeking (at the expense of shareholders) rather
than theories on contracting incentives.
Thus, bank CEO pay must be treated as an issue open for further research: on
the  one  hand,  the  existing  evidence  has  not  yet  systematically  examined
potentials for abuse in bank compensation structures
65. On the other hand,
some  potential  for  abuse  may  have  been  successfully  curtailed  by  bank
regulators, in which case bank compensation contracts may actually be less
problematic than those found in industry.
2.1.5 Ownership and Board Structure
It  is  well-developed  in  the  general  corporate  governance  literature  that
ownership structure is important for corporate performance. Elements of the
discussion  include  the  general  dispersion  of  shares
66,  or  the  existence  of
blockholders
67 and institutional investors
68. Governance issues related to the
ownership of financial institutions have been most actively discussed in the
context of alternative organizational forms, most notably mutual or stock
organization.
2.1.5.1 Mutuals and stockholder-owned financial institutions
The  existence  of  different  organizational  forms  within  the  same  regulated
industry provides the researcher with a natural experiment from which to draw
policy conclusions. Thus, there are a number of studies examining the relative
merits of organizational form typically at the example of US Savings and Loans.
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64 Yermack  (1997)  documents  that  managers  use  their  inside  information  to  time  option
awards. Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (2000) find that strike price resetting of such options
correlates  with  conflicts  of  interests  on  the  respective  boards  compensation  committees:  “A
stronger version of this claim is that managers use their power over corporate governance to
appropriate wealth from stockholders in various forms, including resetting” (p. 123).
65 Although the evidence presented by Angbazo and Narayanan (1997) could potentially be
reinterpreted in this way.
66 Demsetz  and  Lehn  (1985)  did  not  find  a  significant  relationship  between  ownership
dispersion and long-term firm performance.
67 Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997).
68 The performance effects of institutional ownership are currently debated in the literature.
Lately,  Duggal  and  Millar  (1999)  have  argued  that  institutional  ownership  itself  may  be
endogenous.Early on, mutuals were deemed to suffer from governance defects due to their
ownership structure
69. Akella and Greenbaum (1988) argued that the greater
diffusion  of  ownership  in  mutual  S&L’s would  lead  to  more  pronounced
expense  preference  behavior  of  managers  in  mutual  vs.  stock  owned
institutions. Yet, an early test of this proposition by Mester (1989) could not
support  expense  preference  behavior  in  either  institutional  form.  Later,
Mester  (1993)  examined  the  relative  cost  efficiency  of  mutual  and  stock
S&L’s to find that stock S&L’s were on average actually less efficient than
mutuals. 
Next to cost efficiency, the comparative performance of mutual and stock
S&L’s is a fruitful avenue to research the relative merits of organizational
structures. Here, Cole and Mehran (1998) support the notion against financial
mutuals by demonstrating that those institutions that convert from mutual to
stock  S&L’s,  performance  is  improving  significantly.  A caveat  of  such
findings  is  that  the  conversion  decision  is  potentially  endogenous  for
technology  or  regulatory  reasons
70,  which  would  cloud  the  inference  that
organizational  form  is  responsible  for  the  observed  performance
improvements.  Nonetheless,  Cole  and  Mehran  (1998)  also  find  that  the
change  in  management  ownership  is  positively  correlated  with  the  post-
conversion change in performance, which supports a positive governance role
for management ownership stakes in this setting, and stands in contrast to the
above findings by Aharony, Falk and Lin (1996).
The evidence from the UK, however, stands in contradiction to the notion that
financial mutuals are outperformed by stock banks
71. Valnek (1999) finds that
UK stock retail banks have been outperformed by mutual building societies
in his data set, and traces the advantages of the mutual form to the union of
depositor and owner roles, an issue we shall return to further down below.
Similarly, Ferri, Masciandaro and Messori (2001) found savings banks in
Italy to have been outperformed by cooperative and mutual banks, although
savings banks in Italy have their own governance problems due to public
ownership exercised through bank foundations
72.
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69 Deshmukh, Greenbaum and Thakor (1982).
70 Masulis (1987) has argued that technology and regulatory changes have eroded some of the
competitive advantages of mutuals, leading to increased volumes of conversions.
71 Altunbas, Evans and Molyneux (2001) present evidence that also in Germany, privately
owned banks are not more efficient than mutuals or publicly owned savings banks. See also Kregel
(1997).
72 See also Bruzzone (1997).The implications of organizational form can also be examined in the context of
mergers, which were argued above to carry far less of a corporate governance
interpretation for mutuals than for stock banks. Yet, Llewellyn and Holmes
(1991)  have  examined  the  governance  of  mutuals  versus  PLC  financial
institutions paying particular attention to the takeover market as a governance
institution.  They  conclude  that  the  evidence  of  actual  experiences  in  the
takeover market suggests that they may not be suitable for atextbook corporate
governance role
73. Most importantly, they argue that competition in the product
markets is the most successful disciplining device in either corporate form.
Thus, they soundly reject the notion that mutuals should be forced to convert
to PLC’s based on the suspicion of a governance problem due to the lack of
a market for corporate control motivated by their ownership structure.
The  preceding  discussion  supports  the  contention  that  the  ownership
characteristics of mutual versus stock financial institutions may not only be
interpreted  in  a traditional  corporate  governance  paradigm.  Rasmussen
(1988) argues that mutual managers have an incentive to reduce risks in order
to protect a high income over a lifetime. They cannot gain from risk-reward
combinations due to regulatory restrictions on their income. Thus, their safe
strategy may appeal to risk-averse depositors. Davis (2001) argues that the
one-shareholder-one-vote rule has helped protect this corporate form despite
a generational conflict, where “old” owners have an incentive to cash in on
the  accumulated  surplus  in  a mutual  by  going  public.  It  will  be  further
discussed below, in how far banks organized as mutuals may answer regulator
concerns at the potential expense of shareholder interests.
2.1.5.2 Institutional ownership
The interest of a governance role for institutional investors such as CalPERS
or TIAA-CREF, which has by now a track record in the general corporate
governance  literature,  has  not  been  spilled  over  to  the  literature  on
institutional investors’ role in the governance of banks. Ely and Song (2000)
find that bidders in bank takeovers seem to engage in wealth maximization as
long as the institution had a significant blockholder, who may have performed
a meaningful monitoring role. Even these scant results may, however, be
called into doubt by the results of Becher and Swisher (2001), who claim that
institutional investors can identify “winners” early, and significantly increase
their  holdings  in  such  firms  before  takeover  announcements.  Then,  the
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73 This complements the findings by Franks and Mayer (1996) for the governance role of
takeovers in the UK in general. See also above.identity of large blockholders may at least be to some extent endogenous to
successful merger decisions.
2.1.5.3 Boards of Directors of financial institutions
The survey by John and Senbet (1998) on board effectiveness from a finance
perspective may serve as evidence for a keen interest in the workings of
internal  oversight,  which  has  also  found  some  response  in  banking.  In
a seminal contribution, Brickley and James (1987) claim that if states do not
allow takeovers as a disciplining device, internal oversight through a board of
directors  should  compensate  for  the  lack  of  an  external  governance
mechanism. Evidence was provided by examining banks in States with and
without takeover restrictions in banking, but the substitution theory finds only
weak support. Yet, in keeping with the discussion of the paper by Hubbard
and Palia (1995) above, the results may be driven by a size effect: banks in
States with takeover restrictions cannot grow as efficiently. Thus, the results
by Brickley and James may in part reflect the inadequacy of a governance
interpretation of State takeover regulations in banking.
Pi and Timme (1993) find bank performance and cost efficiency only related
to the issue of identity of CEO and Chairman of the Board. Large institutional
and blockholder ownership, as well as the proportion of outside directors do
not seem to be relevant to performance. Angbazo and Narayanan (1997) find
that boards with more outsiders are more likely to award bank CEO’s with
long-term incentives in the form of stocks and stock options. This is especially
true for managers that are more entrenched. Whether this is a sign of a positive
role of a board versus weak boards in the presence of rent-seeking managers
may be subject to interpretation. Also, there may again be a size effect in the
background, since large institutions are more likely to have outsiders on the
board, and also are more accustomed to award incentive related pay structures.
Whidbee (1997) confirms that outside shareholders are more likely to gain
board seats when their relative shares increase. Subrahmanyam, Rangan and
Rosenstein  (1997)  then  show  that  bidder abnormal  returns  in  bank
acquisitions are positively related to the proportion of ownership held by
outside directors, but only with high levels of inside ownership. They are
negatively  related  to  the  proportion  of  outside  directors:  does  only  their
financial interest motivate them to perform a meaningful monitoring role?
Brook, Hendershott and Lee (2000) find that the only role of outside directors
in merger targets may be to convince management to accept an attractive
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S&L survival  in  the  1980’s correlated  with  both  a greater  proportion  of
independent directors as well as better CEO compensation in terms of dollars
of assets managed. Thus, their findings reserve a positive role for outside
board members in the S&L experience. However, as noted above, size related
pay is commonly observed across firms, and may indicate that the results
stand for some other – more hidden – relationship.
In support of a positive role for boards in bank governance are only the
findings regarding S&L survival, although even there it is possible that the
prevalence of outside board members may proxy for other variables that are
providing a more direct link to firm survival
74. Astudy linking long-term bank
performance  to  board  characteristics  has  not  yet  been  conducted,  but  the
results from industrial firms are not encouraging
75.
The literature on the more direct governance mechanisms through ownership
and boards of directors is not unanimous. The largest part of that literature has
compared  mutual  and  stock  institutions,  and  has  delivered  mixed  results.
Most notably, it seems that the governance consequences of the ownership
structure  in  mutuals  may  not  be  the  only  element  characteristic  for  their
performance. The (very thin) evidence on institutional and blockholdings in
banks is not pointing unequivocally to a strong force in governance either.
Regarding boards of directors, the evidence suggests that a positive role for
outsiders can be attested only during the S&L crisis. Yet, if this result holds
up, it may not be underestimated, since prevention of bankruptcy seems to be
a larger achievement than the marginal increase in returns on investment. It
may point to an insight already gained in the general governance literature
76:
that the governance role of the board becomes relevant mostly in times of
distress.
2.1.6 Management Turnover
A general question at the end of this section is then, whether management
turnover is related to performance at all. If it would not be, it would point to
58 Bank managers between shareholders and regulators: the empirical evidence
74 For  example,  in  a  CEO  dominated  board,  outside  membership  may  be  endogenous  to
performance.
75 Fosberg (1989) and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991).
76 Vafeas (1999) documents that the frequency of board meetings increases with deteriorating
performance as measured by share price declines.a general governance failure. However, the early evidence provided by Barro
and Barro (1990) demonstrated that performance was highly correlated with
management turnover in banks. Recently, also Hayes, Oyer and Schaefer
(2001) have examined performance links of management turnover, but with
some  troubling  undertones.  It  was,  for  example,  found  that  in  poorly
performing banks and thrifts turnover among non-CEO executives was more
sensitive  to  firm  performance  than  turnover  of  CEOs.  However,  when
performance is worse, the likelihood that the whole management team will be
exchanged by a new CEO is increased. Thus, due to whatever reasons, there
is a governance mechanism that holds managements of financial institutions
accountable, but it is not clear whether a single mechanism can be isolated as
effecting  management  accountability.  It  is  not  even  clear  whether  it  is
necessarily shareholders who – in one form or another – seek to defend their
interests versus a financial institution by replacing management teams. In
a seminal contribution, Prowse (1997a) has documented that – while total
control  changes  in  the  sample  are  similar  to  the  experience  reported  by
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) – half of the control changes in US bank
holding companies were initiated by regulators, not shareholders.
However, the careful analysis by Ferri (1997) reminds us that management
turnover is not necessarily a signal of quality. In a sample of small and large
Italian  banks,  he  observed  that  banks  with  higher  branch management
turnover had larger amounts of non-performing loans, that large banks had
higher management turnover, that banks with higher management turnover
had less concentrated customer relationships, and that customers of banks
with high turnover were more likely to have multiple banking relationships.
Ferri explains the difference between large and small banks such that in large
banks,  headquarters  may  have  an  agency  problem  with  branch  managers
when they have too much of an information superiority. Then, large banks
strike a compromise between the beneficial effects of information on the
lending relationship with clients, and detrimental effects due to the internal
agency problem. This mechanism would grant some competitive advantage to
small banks at the local level
77. It also supports the notion voiced in section
1.2. that there is a cost to overly frequent management transition.
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77 Of course, as Berger et al. (2002) would argue, it is entirely plausible that the competitive
advantage  at  the  local  level  is  due  to  small  institutions  being  better  at  processing  ‘soft’
information, which is required in small firm lending. Then, Ferri’s results can be interpreted such
that headquarters do not understand the deficiencies of their own structure form small business
lending, they end up with less loyal customers, and the subsequent problems with non-performing
loans trigger management turnover.2.1.7 Conclusions on the shareholder-manager conflict in banking
The literature on the governance of the banking firm as presented above can
be summarized as follows: the takeover markets, viewed as a cornerstone of
a market  system  of  corporate  governance  are  likely  to  be  overrated  as
a governance mechanism. Rather, banks natural access to funds favors a free
cash flow interpretation of many mergers. In particular, it is argued above that
the regulatory interest in mergers to effect necessary consolidation in banking
should be more closely examined.
The  results  on  managerial  share  ownership  were  shown  to  parallel  those
found in governance studies of industrial firms: ownership can have both
positive incentive as well as negative entrenchment effects. However, the
literature is only beginning to wake up to the challenges of the potential
endogeneity of management shares, leaving many previous results tentative.
Management  compensation  structures  in  banking  are  viewed  largely  as
beneficial in the interest of owners. What is lacking at this point is a more
detailed analysis of the potential abuses of managerial pay packages as has been
documented at various points in studies of industrial firms. Yet, there is adistinct
possibility that the results in banking may be different from those found in
industry since regulators may carefully monitor bank compensation practices.
Studies examining the ownership structure of banks have yielded fruitful
results  from  an  unexpected  angle:  financial  mutuals  do  not  seem  to  be
disadvantaged  vis-à-vis  their  stock-owned  competitors.  We  are  going  to
elaborate  on  the  favorable  regulatory  dimension  of  financial  cooperatives
below.  Here  it  is  worth  noting  that  they  do  not  seem  to  suffer  from
a performance  deficit.  With  respect  to  monitoring  performed  by  a large
blockholder, their influence becomes more significant when they also hold
board seats. However, the beneficial effects of outsiders on a bank’s board has
only unequivocably been demonstrated for poorly performing S&L’s, who
were  less  likely  to  go  bankrupt  when  outsiders  were  on  the  board.
A comparison with boardroom practice in industry
78 reveals that – if at all –
the boardroom is only used as a monitoring institution in times of distress.
A concern with a number of studies cited in this section is the potential for
size to be related to a number of governance issues. Small banks are more
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78 Demb and Neubauer (1992).likely targets of (frivolous?) takeover attempts, but are also more likely to be
controlled by owner-managers that resist such takeovers, hence leaving the
impression of entrenchment. Small banks are less likely to use performance
related  pay  schedules,  but  it  has  not  been  researched,  whether  this  is
compensated for by increased management share ownership. Small – insider
dominated – banks would be less likely to attract institutional investors, and
are less likely to have an outsider dominated board. Small banks are, however,
more likely to be organized as cooperatives. The governance infrastructure in
small  banks  is  likely  to  be  different  from  that  in  large  banks  just  as  the
governance  infrastructure  in  small  firms  generally  is  different  from  large
firms in industry
79. It seems that the difference is rather one of observability:
due to the public interest, more is known on the structure of small banks than
of small firms, especially when they are closely held.
It may thus be true that small banks should be treated conceptually different
from large banks. We shall return to this issue in the policy discussion in
chapter three.
2.2 Banks and Regulators
Shareholders have a vital stake in the performance of the financial firms they
have invested in, but are by no means alone in their desire to control the fate
of the institution. A competing interest was derived above for creditors of the
banking firm – depositors.
The  purpose  of  this  section  is  to  survey  the  empirical  literature  on  bank
regulation in order to gain an understanding on the validity of the various
theoretical  arguments  reviewed  or  derived  above,  and  whether  the
prescriptions for regulatory behavior are accurate. In the end, this should
further our understanding on the actual nature of regulatory policy versus
banks and their managers.
2.2.1 Asset illiquidity and information opacity of bank balance sheets
The first – and arguably most important – step in this direction is to verify that
bank  loans  are  indeed  illiquid,  and  that  therefore  –  as  Calomiris  (1999,
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79 Compare Harm (1992a) and Harm (1992b).p.1502) states – “the lack of clear information about bank asset values ... are
intrinsic to the function of the bank”
80. Such evidence is likely to be inferred
indirectly from the behavior of market participants that information about
banks is different from information about industrial firms.
Among the papers allowing an inference on this topic, Slovin, Sushka and
Polonchek (1991) show that the markets react negatively to the news of sale-
and-lease-back  agreements  or  asset  divestitures  by  US  Bank  Holding
Companies. In industry, this is typically viewed positively by the markets as
a start of a necessary restructuring, and provides evidence of the managerial
will to go through with it. In banking, it is more likely that such sales are seen
as a signal about the true state of the financial institution, and thus represents
a negative signal. This interpretation can only be carried, if bank financial
statements are opaque due to the nature of their business.
Studying  a sample  of  393  bank  IPO’s from  1983  to  1991,  Houge  and
Loughran (1999) found these IPO’s to lag various benchmarks. In particular,
the poor performance is concentrated in larger institutions with aggressive
loan growth. Since loan growth is easily observable, but loan performance is
not, investors may have overestimated bank value at the time of the IPO by
focusing on loan growth. Again, such interpretation of the data can only be
carried  if  bank  asset  values  are  opaque.  There  is  thus  some  evidence  to
support the notion regarding the illiquidity of bank loans.
A caveat not to carry this interpretation too far, however, is provided among
others by Thomas (2001), who examines securitized loans in the USA, which
now stand at roughly $2.5 trillion. This is highly significant when judged
against the total assets of all US banks of approximately $5 trillion. A large
part  of  the  securitized  loans  manages  to  be  traded  without  government
subsidies, implying that commercial banking has developed features similar
to investment banking. Then, the large volume of loans sold in securitization
bears witness to the fact that a large fraction of bank loans must be more
liquid than theory presumes
81.
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80 Goodhart (1988, p.104): “... the key feature of banking, which leads to its vulnerability, is
its function of providing fixed nominal value loans to borrowers, where information costs make it
impossible to observe the actual outcome of the project, for which the loan was sought, at all
accurately. This characteristic . makes the “true” market value of banks’assets uncertain – indeed
not strictly calculable – which both raises the risk of runs and makes bank supervision, and
support, more necessary and more difficult.”
81As a caveat, Rule (2001) reasons that the banking system remains the ultimate party exposed
to risks associated with securitized loans. See also The Economist (Feb. 9-15 2002, p.61).Asimilar – albeit weaker – case can be made with respect to syndicated loans,
for which Dennis and Mullineaux (2000) report a stock in excess of $1 trillion
in 1997. The authors trace syndication not only to borrower transparency, but
also to the reputation of the syndicate leader, suggesting that such reputation
effects  may  overcome  problems  of  asset  illiquidity
82.  Still,  the  authors
confirm that the salability of debt claims remains related to information and
potential agency problems so that the main working hypothesis for the theory
of the banking firm remains largely intact, at least for the assets that remain
on the banks’ books.
2.2.2 Contagion after bank failures
A second necessary prerequisite for the regulation of banks is some evidence
that a single bank panic may indeed spread to other institutions and lead to an
economy-wide  credit  crunch  with  all  crippling  side-effects.  Indeed,  the
survey by Kaufman (1994) commences by citing leading US bank regulators
defending regulation primarily with reference to contagion in banking crises.
Early evidence by Pettway (1976), and Aharony and Swary (1983) seemed to
support this notion. The survey by Kaufman (1994) demonstrated, however,
that the issue of bank contagion and systemic risk could be seen in two different
lights. For one thing, depositors can run indiscriminately on other banks when
they see one failure. This would be irrational contagion. Then again, the failure
of one bank may merely be a signal for the survival probability of others, in
which case contagion should be the more likely, the more similar the institution
to  the  failed  bank.  This  would  be  rational  (or  informational)  contagion.
Kaufman (1994) interprets much of the literature on the topic as consistent with
the latter, i.e. bank-specific rather than industry-wide runs.
Such insights are typically gained by examining the impact of isolated bank
failures on prices (equity returns, deposit or interbank rates, or subordinated
debt yields) or quantity adjustments (deposit migration). However, for the
Pre-FDIC era, Saunders and Wilson (1996) found similar deposit losses in
banks  that  later  failed  or  survived,  pointing  at  industry-wide  contagion.
Kaufman’s blames  currency  runs  triggering  systemic  bank  runs,  and  the
recent insights on twin crises
83 would add credence to this view.
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82 See also Harm (2001).
83 Kaminsky and Reinhardt (1999).The  recent  literature  on  bank  contagion  has  further  solidified
Kaufman’s conclusions.  Lately,  Aharony  and  Swary  (1996)  showed  that
contagion  effects  are  more  severe  for  more  proximate,  larger,  and  less
capitalized  banks.  The  geographic  contagion  effect  is  hypothesized  by
theoretical arguments in Temzelides (1997), and has also been verified for
small financial institutions in Colorado and Kansas
84. Geographic proximity
may proxy for similar risk exposure, and runs are thereby informed rather
than irrational. Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1999) analyzed the impact of
dividend reductions at commercial banks to find that contagion-type reactions
were restricted to large money center banks, while in smaller regional banks
positive competitive effects were found in rival institutions. These results are
replicated by Bessler and Nohel (2000), who interpret them as consistent with
informed rather than irrational runs. Also the study by Jordan et al. (2000)
examines market reactions to the announcement of formal supervisory action
to conclude that contagious effect are merely based on improved information.
Akhigbe and Madura (2001) support the existence of contagion effects for
a larger  sample  involving  smaller  bank  failures,  where  smaller  and  less
capitalized rivals experience more severe contagion effects. Interestingly, the
passage  of  FIRREA has  reduced  the  contagious  effects,  indicating  that
regulation does play a role in limiting contagion after bank failures. Whether
this is good (more depositor protection) or bad (less market discipline for
banks) may lie in the eye of the beholder.
Importantly, the work on bank contagion indirectly supports the information
opacity hypothesis of bank financial statements. However, the diagnosis of
rational, bank-specific contagion is no consolation to the regulator. The recent
experience in Japan is systemic, and alerts to a need for regulation. Yet, the
Japanese experience also points at the pitfalls of the government safety net:
when depositors do not run, and regulators do not close banks, inefficient or
even insolvent banks are de facto allowed to continue operations. Kaufman
(1994,  p.138)  argues  that  some  Pre-FDIC  bank  runs  actually  led  to  the
efficient closure of unsound institutions with lower overall losses. If runs are
contained, they have a positive disciplinary element, and this may enhance
aggregate welfare. Yet, runs typically have a negative distributional element,
which reintroduces the government via the public choice mechanism.
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84 Hendrickson (2000).2.2.3 The safety net
If  we  take  the  opacity  of  bank  financial  information  and  the  problem  of
contagion  of  bank  runs  as  given,  a role  for  some  type  of  safety  net  is
established
85. The two most commonly mentioned mechanisms are a deposit
insurance, which eliminates the necessity for depositors to run in times of
trouble, and a lender of last resort, who can provide liquidity once a bank run
has commenced
86. In the latter case, depositors would see that there is no need
for liquidating their balances, and they will be re-deposited. Inasmuch as they
are  not,  however,  the  cost  of  such  a bail-out  is  born  via  the  inflation
mechanism. Bail-out via a public deposit insurance scheme – if it becomes
necessary – is paid for through the fiscal budget, and there is – if at all – more
indirect link to inflationary pressures.
Goodhart (1988) argues that “Clearinghouses”, banks which attract a large
share of overall interbank deposits, emerge naturally in a banking sector as
those  institutions,  which  have  earned  the  highest  esteem  for  prudent
management  from  their  peers. Yet,  the  provision  of  services  to  potential
competitor banks is exposing a conflict of interest inside the clearinghouse,
which is best overcome by allocating the function to a centralized, non-profit
organization, which does not compete with other banks
87. Such institution
could then provide services, including the provision of liquidity to troubled
institutions in order to avert contagious runs. An additional safety feature
would be an insurance scheme for bank deposits, which Goodhart (1988,
Ch. 6) argues should also be run by the public sector for credibility reasons
88.
Kahn and Santos (2001) address the issue of shared responsibility between
deposit insurer and lender-of-last-resort to argue that bank monitoring and
closure authority should rest with the insurer, while loans provided by the
LOLR should be junior to all other claims except bank equity. Indeed, Mason
(2001)  attributes  some  bank  failures  in  the  1930’s on  the  policy  of  the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation to subordinate depositor and investor
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85 Goodhart (1988, p.77): “... experience suggested that competitive pressures in a milieu of
limited information (and, thence, contagion risk) would lead to procyclical fluctuations punctuated
by banking panics. It was this experience that led to the formation of non-competitive, non-profit-
maximizing Central Banks.”
86 See Dale (2000) for a survey of the theory and practice of deposit insurance, and Bruni and
de Boissieu (2000) for a discussion of Lender-of-last-resort issues in the Eurozone.
87 Similarly Goodhart and Schoenmaker (1995).
88 Every insurance scheme is finally limited, while the taxation or inflation power of the
government is theoretically unlimited.interests. Garcia (2000) reviews international evidence and experience with
deposit  insurance  schemes  to  advocate  an  explicit  albeit  limited  deposit
insurance scheme embedded in a system with a functioning LOLR and strong
regulators and supervisors.
A major issue in the empirical literature is to determine, whether deposit
insurance or LLR liquidity guarantees indeed induce banks to shift their asset
portfolio to higher risks
89. Early on, it was clear that this line of literature
would be plagued by measurement problems
90. Brickley and James (1986)
demonstrated that stock returns are an insufficient means to identify asset
risk, since modified insolvency rules as defined by the S&L regulators have
reduced the correlation between stock returns and S&L asset risks.
Looking at S&L asset portfolios, Brewer, Jackson and Mondschean (1996)
found  possible  evidence  that  additional  diversification  opportunities  were
used to shift risks by at least some S&L’s who were not specialized in real
estate. Conversely, Akhigbe and Whyte (2001) showed that the passage of the
FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 significantly reduced bank risk, especially
for larger institutions with lower capitalization and higher credit risks on their
books. This  would  be  consistent  with  undesirable  risk  shifting  under  the
previous, more lenient regulatory environment. Hovakimian and Kane (2000)
found risk-shifting activities in banks with low capital and low debt to deposit
ratios, i.e. those with more limited outsider monitoring. The authors could
also document improving conditions after regulatory tightening in 1991.
However,  a long-term  study  by  Saunders  and  Wilson  (1999)  could  not
identify significant risk shifts in banks between 1893 and 1992. This is rather
significant, since in the 1890’s, banks were well capitalized and often did not
enjoy limited liability for owners, but double liability, where owners had to
secure the paid-in capital twice over
91. As a corollary, double liability may
serve as proof that legislators were already concerned with bank risk before
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89 Freixas, Giannini, Hoggarth and Soussa (2000) argue that the lender of last resort provokes
moral hazard when bailing out individual banks, but that it can be contained through making
access to liquidity costly and uncertain. Martin (2001) claims that – unlike deposit insurance –
LOLR intervention can be structured through Central Bank repurchase policy such as to eliminate
all moral hazard.
90 Goodhart (1988, p.79): “There is no objective, and widely agreed, means of assessing risk”.
91 Esty  (1998)  finds  that  increased  owner  liability  of  banks  reduces  risk-taking  in  these
institutions, which is consistent with the findings presented by Saunders and Wilson (1999) for
that time period. See also Grossman (2001), who finds that banks operating in States with double
liability rules were less risky, but that these rules could not guarantee bank stability in times of
widespread financial distress.the advent of deposit insurance. Still, the introduction of limited liability
coupled with mispriced deposit insurance could then lead to more perverse
incentives for bank managers. Saunders and Wilson (1999) find that asset risk
choices made by banks in the 1980’s are comparable to those made in the
1890’s, and that bank capital ratios are as sensitive to asset risk then as now.
The results are interpreted with reference to residual market discipline as well
as the possibility of regulatory moral suasion. The latter point is supported by
DeYoung,  Hughes  and  Moon  (2001),  who  claim  that  regulators  can
distinguish between ‘efficient’ risk shifts, which promise higher returns, and
‘inefficient’ ones, which only exploit the regulatory externality. They claim
that the former banks are given significantly more latitude in their investment
strategies than the latter banks.
Looking at a sample of European banks, Gropp and Vesala (2001) find that
the  introduction  of  explicit  deposit  insurance  actually  reduced  bank  risk
taking. Their interpretation, however, is that banks were previously betting on
implicit insurance guarantees by the public sector, and that the introduction of
explicit insurance de facto reduced the extent of guarantees. In the light of the
findings by Saunders and Wilson (1999), however, their results may also be
interpreted as a rather weak link from the deposit insurance externality to
bank risk-taking behavior.
Hence,  either  the  incentives  to  engage  in  risk-shifting  are  at  times
overestimated,  or  regulatory  policies  may  compensate  for  inefficient
incentives.  The  former  point  is  supported  by  the  theoretical  work  by
Niinimäki (2001), who claims that risk-shifting incentives are mitigated if
bank loan portfolios consist of overlapping long-term loans. The latter point
would be supported by DeYoung, Hughes and Moon (2001).
The reason why the literature persistently connects deposit insurance to risk-
shifting incentives lies most certainly in studies of the mechanics of banking
crises, not in the least the US S&L debacle. The analysis by Kane (1989,
1992)  reserved  a prominent  role  for  the  deposit  insurance  externality  in
explaining the S&L crisis. Brewer (1995) found positive stock value effects
in S&L’s conducting risk increasing asset shifts. Knopf and Teall (1996) find
less S&L risk-taking in the post-FIRREA period, which is also supported by
the  results  of  Cebenoyan,  Cooperman  and  Register  (1999).  Both  studies
support  the  notion  that  tightening  regulatory  standards  tend  to  curb  the
excesses, but that excesses were observed.
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regarding  deposit  insurance  with  case  studies  from  Chile, Venezuela  and
Mexico. Demirgüc-Kunt and Detriagache (2001) find that deposit insurance
variables  scored  significant  in  regressions  that  predict  financial  crises.
However,  countries  with  developed  governance  institutions  were  able  to
compensate  the  negative  effects  of  deposit  insurance.  This  would  be
consistent with the claim by DeYoung, Hughes and Moon (2001) that US
regulators  “know  what  they  are  doing”.  Thus,  in  the  end  problems  with
deposit insurance may more likely be concentrated in developing economies.
This in turn could indicate political economy considerations that are beyond
the scope of this paper
92.
It is certainly risky to deny that deposit insurance has no effect on bank risk-
seeking  at  all.  Yet,  the  identification  of  risk-shifts  faces  measurement
problems due to bank financial statement opacity, while the issue of implicit
government  guarantees  makes  it  harder  to  measure  the  effect  of  explicit
schemes. Also, it seems fair to say that deposit insurance alone may not be
sufficient to induce risk-shifting behavior on the side of banks. It also takes
an existing crisis, an excessively lax regulatory environment, or both.
2.2.4 Bank charter value
The charter value of financial institutions has often been mentioned as amarket
substitute for regulatory efforts. Bhattacharya, Boot and Thakor (1998) explain
charter value to be arent stream associated with the mere ‘existence’of abank.
Since default or closure is terminating the rent-stream, banks with significant
charter  values  may  behave  more  cautiously  than  others
93.  This  would  be
consistent with the notion that risk shifting occurs especially in times of
financial distress rather than due to deposit insurance incentives alone. During
times of financial crisis, charter values tend to be lowest.
Humphrey and Pulley (1997) showed that interest rate deregulation in the
early 1980’s suppressed profitability of financial institutions for a decade,
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92 This is also consistent with the assessment by Garcia (2000): “A well-designed deposit
insurance system, supported by effective bank supervision and a modern legal and accounting
infrastructure, can promote financial integrity: unfortunately, a poorly designed system can detract
from it.”
93 More precisely, as in Kreps and Wilson (1982b), threat of termination of a rent stream
induces less deviant behavior that supports the development of a reputation.which implies lower charter values. As a response, banks engaged not only in
cost  savings,  but  also  in  higher  risk  and  return  investments,  which  is
consistent  with  risk-shifting  incentives  due  to  lower  charter  values.
Nonetheless, some less than competitive market structures were identified,
which would preserve some charter value. A similar analysis was conducted
by  Keeley  (1990),  who  found  declining  charter  values  with  increasing
competition, followed by decreased capital ratios and increased risk. Brewer
(1995) demonstrated that stock returns of low capitalized S&L’s increased
when asset risk was increased, which was not the case for well-capitalized
S&L’s. Galloway, Lee and Roden (1997) examined bank behavior between
1974 to 1994 to demonstrate that banks with high charter values did not
change risk-taking behavior over the sample period, but low charter value
banks assumed significantly more risk beginning in 1983, a behavior that
continued into the early 1990’s, when – according to Humphrey and Pulley
(1997) – bank profitability was restored.
These studies together suggest that bank risk-taking incentives are reduced
with increasing charter value. This, however, was put in perspective in a study
by Saunders and Wilson (2001), who argued that there is also an inverse
causality from bank risk to charter value. They find that high charter values
lead to increased capital during expansion times, but that the relationship
reverses during economic contractions. Economic conditions may then be the
exogenous force behind loan portfolio risk.
The results on the effects of charter value seem rather consistent to suggest
that risk-taking is more desirable in financial distress situations. However,
Berger and Hannan (1998) warn against taking this as an opportunity to return
to a bank regulation philosophy that grants institutions a sheltered life in order
to induce risk averse bank policies
94. They determine the main costs of such
policy  not  necessarily  in  the  welfare  loss  inherent  in  all  anti-competitive
measures, but in the X-inefficiencies associated with a ‘sheltered life’
95. Thus,
charter value may continue to be a welcome byproduct of successful financial
institutions. It may be less suitable as an element of the regulatory objective
function. Regulators then need other powers at their disposal.
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94 Teranishi  (1997)  describes  the  Japanese  regulatory  principle  of  the  “convoy  system”
precisely in these terms.
95 Hicks (1935 p.8): “The best of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.”2.2.5 Closure, forbearance and resolution
In order for regulatory rules to be binding, regulators must be able to close
those  banks  that  have  failed.  There  are  important  issues  associated  with
efficient closure. An expectation on the side of banks that closure is an empty
threat increases the moral hazard problem. At the same time, the resolution
process should be structured such that more bank wealth is preserved.
As  to  the  issue  of  closure,  Cebenoyan,  Cooperman  and  Register  (1993)
demonstrated that measured X-efficiency scores have predictive value for
future closure of both mutual and stock S&L’s. Closure, however, is only
a 0-1 variable, and the regulator bears responsibility to define a process that
minimizes frictions and tax payer losses. With opaque bank assets, this can be
a problem, which was confirmed by Barth, Bartholomew and Bradley (1990),
who found that tangible net worth significantly understates market net worth
– a problem related to asset illiquidity in banks.
Asset illiquidity can create potential costs in the resolution process, which
accrue to the tax payer. One solution in the Pre-FIRREAperiod was observed
by Fraser and Zhang (1997): package bidding – the practice of packaging
failed depositary institutions – was an innovation to reduce the total cost to
the tax payer. This may be evidence that individual thrifts could not diversify
optimally due to geographical limitations, but it may also be simply a way to
overcome the lemons problem by lumping assets together indiscriminately.
Also Pre-FIRREA, Guo (1999) showed that forbearance was a reality in thrift
resolutions,  and  that  also  personal  and  political  factors  influenced  such
timing. Hence, the signals emanating from that process were not incentive
compatible.
On the whole, the literature agrees that thrift resolution changed for the better
with the passage of FIRREA in 1989 and the creation of the Resolution Trust
Corporation. Gardner and Stover (1998) find some improvement in a shift to
a process structured like a private value auction. Gupta, LeCompte and Misra
(1997a) find no significant acquirer gains in RTC assisted takeovers, which
could not be shown for the previous period. However, Varaiya and Ely (1997)
document resolution delays resulting ultimately in higher resolution costs.
Also Kaufman and Seelig (2001) address the issue of losses incurred due to
delays in resolution.
In all, the articles presented here suggest that there most certainly are frictions
associated  with  bank  closures,  but  that  these  can  be  somewhat  mitigated
70 Bank managers between shareholders and regulators: the empirical evidencethrough  appropriate  regulatory  oversight.  Interestingly,  Kaufman  (1994,
p.138)  suggests  that  the  resolution  of  failed  banks,  despite  problems  of
forbearance  and  asset  illiquidity,  was  comparatively  more  efficient  than
comparable procedures of non-banks in Chapter 11: creditors recovered more
money in less time. One interpretation of this evidence is that regulatory
closure is invoked in a more timely manner than Chapter 11, an issue we shall
return to. Yet, the true objective of the regulator is not to effect efficient
auctions of failed institutions, but to avoid closing institutions in the first place.
2.2.6 Bank capital regulation
Once the state has assumed a fiduciary duty for the safety of bank deposits, it
has absorbed the incentive structure of debt governance, which leads to the
creation of a regulatory body as described in chapter one. One of the ways to
reduce the likelihood of financial problems that could endanger the safety of
deposits  is  to  require  banks  to  improve  on  their  capitalization,  thereby
lowering the chance of default.
The issue of bank capitalization has been reviewed extensively by Berger,
Herring and Szegö (1995), who start their inquiry from a Corporate Finance
perspective to ask, why regulatory capital requirements may differ – be more
stringent than – market-generated capital requirements. After considering ‘the
usual suspects’
96 for why there may be an optimal capital structure also for
banks, they identify the safety net – especially mispriced deposit insurance –
as a primary motivation for regulators to demand more banks capital than the
market would.
A first  question  addressed  in  the  literature  is,  whether  regulatory  capital
requirements  are  in  fact  higher  than  market  requirements,  i.e.  they  are
binding. In an early empirical study, Shome, Smith and Heggestad (1986)
examine bank holding companies between 1974 and 1983 to find that capital
constraints are not binding, since they estimate that banks were not forced to
hold more than shareholder value maximizing amounts of equity. Yet, Cooper,
Kolari and Wagster (1991) find that announcements of risk based capital
adequacy  rules  in  the  1980’s were  generally  associated  with  bank  stock
declines. This would indicate that the market expects banks to have to raise
more capital after the rule changes. Thus, capital regulation would have been
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96 Taxes, Bankruptcy costs, asymmetric information, transactions costs.binding in US, Canadian and UK banks. This is also the conclusion in the
study  performed  by  Wall  and  Peterson  (1995):  for  large  bank  holding
companies in the early 1990’s, bank capital requirements were often binding.
Even  though  regulators  may  achieve  their  primary  goal  of  improved
capitalization, the issue of overall bank risk may not be resolved through this
measure.  Berger,  Herring  and  Szegö  (1995)  identify  ‘unintended
consequences’of higher capital requirements, since banks may opt for a more
risky portfolio instead. Park (1997) models regulatory monitoring and bank
asset choices. A higher capital requirement is found to induce banks to incur
higher asset risk. Similarly, Blum (1999) argues that – since risk tends to
increase expected returns – higher capital requirements would increase the
opportunity costs of equity, and induce riskier investments that way. Calem
and Rob (1999) argue the case for a U-shaped function between capital and
risk-taking. Thus, there is a possibility for a counterproductive element in
bank capital regulation.
Hovakimian and Kane (2000) examine risk-shifting incentives in US banks
from 1985 to 1994 to conclude that low capitalized banks engaged in more
risk-shifting  activities  than  others,  and  that  a 1991  legislation  package
improved on the situation, while still not establishing full regulatory control
over banks’ risk shifting incentives. Also Dahl and Spivey (1996), who look
at equity issues of banks, interpret their results as consistent with a potential
nonviability of low capitalized banks.
Aggarwal and Jacques (2001) support the positive impact of the FDICIA by
demonstrating that subsequently US banks increased their capital without
increasing their risk exposure. Similarly, Rime (2001) finds that regulatory
pressure in Switzerland induced banks to increase capital without increasing
risk.  Bichsel  and  Blum  (2001)  analyze  Swiss  data  to  find  a positive
correlation  between  changes  in  capital  and  changes  in  risk  at  Swiss
institutions, but default risk is invariant to capital ratios.
Beatty and Gron (2001) found no systematic difference in pre- and post-
regulation  behavior  of  financial  institutions.  Banks  might  have  had  an
incentive to shift into riskier assets with the introduction of risk-based capital
standards (RCBS), but this was more than compensated for by improving
their capitalization. This pattern was observed more so for low capitalized
banks, who, the authors claim, were always under greater regulatory scrutiny.
In all, the results suggest that RCBS has induced the lowest capitalized banks
to improve their capitalization, which was the desired end. More supportive
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demonstrate that between 1927 and 1933 capital was used to cushion asset
volatility.
Overall, the empirical literature cannot be viewed consistent with increases in
overall  bank  risk  when  capital  regulation  is  tightened
97.  More  likely,  the
evidence suggests that banks that are already risky due to low capitalization
may  shift  policy  to  incur  higher  levels  of  asset  risk,  but  that  regulatory
stringency can counter those perverse incentives so that regulation seems
overall effective.
2.2.7 Summary on banks and their regulation
The empirical literature comes out largely in support of the view that bank
financial statements are rather opaque. However, bank runs, if they are at all
contagious,  are  usually  of  the  informed  kind,  meaning  that  runs  inform
depositors about the true condition of similar banks when opaque financial
statements cannot. Of course, banking sectors are still vulnerable to financial
shocks, but depositors themselves are not as likely to be a threat to financial
system stability themselves through irrational runs.
The more refined treatment of runs as ‘rational’ would only weaken, but not
eliminate bank regulation, which – as argued above – would also arise by way
of the public choice mechanism as an instrument of debt governance for
depositors, or Goodhart’s argument for continued demand for liquidity by
banks from a central, public institution. LOLR’s and deposit insurance still
arise endogenously.
An important question is, whether these institutions create moral hazard on the
banks’side. Here, the literature is more ambiguous. Grave incentive problems
between  banks  and  regulators  due  to  deposit  insurance  schemes  seem  to
coincide with political economy weaknesses. Also, the empirical investigation
of regulatory tightening in the US through FDICIA and FIRREA points at
a positive impact on bank risk taking. While it is not possible to infer from the
data that the safety net has no impact on bank risk-taking, it is nonetheless
possible that the problem has been overstated with respect to countries with
mature legal systems and properly incentivized regulators.
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97 Milne  (2002)  reasons  that  regulatory  incentives  induce  banks  not  to  counter  capital
regulation with risk shifts.Do we need active regulation and supervision? For one thing, bank charter
value has been established as a reliable motivating factor for banks to refrain
from inefficient risk taking. Yet, this does not mean that regulatory efforts
such as a freezing of high interest margins and blockage of market entry
would achieve the desired results. Regulators must be able to monitor their
risk exposure regularly, and close banks if necessary.
Here, the evidence is surprisingly positive. The resolution of closed US banks
seems  to  have  created  comparatively  less  losses  than  the  Chapter  11
mechanism has for non-bank firms. Even though the system showed elements
of  politically  motivated  forbearance,  the  time  to  resolution  was  typically
shorter  than  the  average  time  firms  spend  in  Chapter  11.  Despite  some
shortcomings, the findings are consistent with relatively timely intervention
in ailing institutions and relatively efficient resolution.
Closure and resolution are only devices of ‘last resort’. Regulators have an
interest to prevent banks from having to be closed, for example through the
imposition of risk-based capital requirements. Here, one concern voiced in
the literature – that bank risk taking may increase with more stringent capital
requirements – does not seem to be born out in the data. Some studies also
indicate that the imposition of risk-based capital requirements has mostly had
a positive impact on overall bank riskiness, which was the desired end.
2.3 Bank managers and regulators
So far, the literature on bank regulation has – for the most part – assumed the
bank to be a monolithic structure with a well-defined agenda. Similar to the
literature on Corporate Finance
98, academics studying bank regulatory issues
recognized that bank policies were shaped by bank management, and that
bank management would not necessarily act in regulators interest, just like
they would not necessarily act in shareholders best interest.
2.3.1 Management share ownership
Thus, bank risk-shifting activities could be linked to managerial incentives.
The first variable to come to mind was the ownership stake of managers.
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smaller amounts of equity holdings would incentivize managers to act in
shareholder interests, while larger holdings would lead to ‘entrenchment’:
managers  can  no  longer  be  disciplined  effectively  by  shareholders.  The
parallel position of regulators versus managements then spawned a literature
relating management share ownership to bank behavior towards risk.
Saunders,  Strock  and  Travlos  (1990)  were  the  first  to  examine  the
relationship, examining the difference between stockholder and management
controlled bank risk taking in periods of deregulation. There, they found that
manager-controlled businesses were more risk averse, which would signal
that – possibly due to lack of diversification of their wealth – they would
stand more to lose from default than shareholders in general.
Gorton  and  Rosen  (1995)  develop  a model  in  which  in  a deteriorating
investment environment, managers entrenched through large share ownership
choose high risk investments. They support this model on a sample of well-
capitalized banks against the hypothesis that risk shifting occurred due to the
FDIC-related moral hazard. Thus, they claim that managerial entrenchment is
a better explanation for observed risk shifts than moral hazard.
Outside  a specific  point  in  the  business  cycle,  Chen,  Steiner  and  Whyte
(1998) report that in their sample of 302 depositary institutions analyzed over
a 6 year period, management ownership is generally negatively related to
institution risk, which suggests that natural risk-aversion dominates equity-
inspired risk-seeking. The opposite insight was communicated by Whidbee
and Wohar (1999), who examine the propensity of 175 BHC’s to hedge, as
proxied by derivative usage. They find that managers owning more than 10%
equity use less derivatives, i.e. engage in risk shifting, while managers with
low equity stakes and more outside directors would use more derivatives. The
authors claim that internal oversight through the board would make managers
with low equity stakes reconsider, since they are not entrenched enough to
‘follow their instincts’ for risk shifting.
The S&L debacle has triggered a number of papers questioning the role of
managerial motivations in the crisis. Cebenoyan, Cooperman and Register
(1995) find that management ownership has different implications for risk-
taking  in  different  regulatory  environments.  In  1988,  the  regulatory
environment was characterized by forbearance, while in 1991 the authors note
that it was characterized by regulatory stringency after the 1989 passage of
FIRREA.  Entrenched  managers  exhibit  greater  risk-taking  behavior  than
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This is consistent with deposit insurance induced moral hazard, but also with
the success of regulatory stringency. Knopf and Teall (1996) find similar
evidence in the thrift industry: pre-FIRREA, insider controlled thrifts engage
in high risk-taking, while post-FIRREA the relationship between risk-taking
and  insider  ownership  is  reduced.  Cebenoyan,  Cooperman  and  Register
(1999) add to their earlier study by adding charter value as an explanatory
variable: in the mid 1980’s, times of regulatory laxity and low charter value,
thrifts engage in ‘unprofitable’risk-taking, while the 1990’s, a period of high
charter value and regulatory stringency, are characterized by ‘profitable’risk-
taking.
Also Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan (1997) incorporate charter value to
their analysis of commercial bank risk-taking to conclude that the relationship
between ownership and risk holds only for low charter value banks: here,
equity incentivized managers overcome their natural risk aversion to engage
in  risk-shifting.  For  high  charter  value  institutions,  their  risk  aversion
prevails.  This  result  is  almost  exactly  mirrored  by Anderson  and  Fraser
(2000): in the late 80’s, when regulation was lax and charter values were low,
more management ownership implied higher risk-taking, while in the early
1990’s this relation was reversed.
In summary, the impact on managerial equity holdings on institution risk can
go both ways. In well-capitalized institutions in a positive business climate
and with high charter value, the risk-aversion instinct of managers dominates.
Only in weak institutions managers would engage in risk-shifting, but activist
regulation has the potential to curb the excesses. Whether the risk-shifting in
weak institutions is due to mispriced deposits or deposit insurance is not
entirely  clear.  It  is  equally  plausible  that  the  above  analyses  point  at
‘gambling  for  resurrection’ as  an  alternative  explanation  of  observed
behavior. 
2.3.2 Management remuneration
There are, as of yet, only a few studies relating management compensation
structures to bank risk-taking, but their predictions would be similar to those
for  management  ownership:  when  management  interest  are  aligned  with
shareholders, bank managers are more likely to engage in risk-taking. Charter
value and risk aversion considerations have the same implications as with
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power of shares.
Joskow et al. (1993) argue that – generally in regulated industries – CEOs`
would have compensation packages that are lower and less responsive to
profitability than those found in unregulated industries. This, however, would
be due to the public perception of ‘excessive’ compensation packages rather
than bank-specific risk considerations. Crawford, Ezzell and Miles (1995)
indeed  find  an  increase  in  the  pay-performance  sensitivity  of  bank  CEO
compensation packages after 1981, a period of deregulation. Also, they find
that banks with lower capitalization increased pay-performance sensitivity
more, which they interpret in light of the moral hazard problem due to the
FDIC insurance umbrella. Evans, Noe and Thornton (1997) argue similarly
that the adoption of golden parachutes for bank managers prior to large bank
failures  exploited  the  insurance  umbrella,  and  virtually  ceased  after  the
FDICIA of 1991.
Yet, the results by Fields and Fraser (1999) indicate that banks branching out
to investment banking did not increase the pay-performance sensitivity of
managerial salaries to match those in investment banking, but remained lower
and similar to the salaries found in banks that did not branch into investment
banking. Thus, the prediction by Joskow et al. (1993) on bank salaries may be
verified in this study, while the fear of bank managers being paid in a way
counterproductive to regulators may be exaggerated. Also the findings by
Houston and James (1995) do not point in this direction: the authors find
a strong relation of equity-based incentives to bank charter value, which they
view as inconsistent with the promotion of risk-taking. Yet, ‘profitable’ risk-
taking may also improve bank charter value, so that there may be at least
some relationship.
Overall, the evidence gathered in the literature so far does not yet allow
conclusive inference on a relationship between management compensation
patterns and regulatory interests, let alone coupled with shareholder interests
as described in the model by John, Saunders and Senbet (2000).
2.3.3 Ownership structure
An issue also found in the regulation literature is that of ownership structure
and organizational form. Here, two studies by Esty (1997a, 1997b) analyzed
the risk-taking behavior of thrift institutions in the 1980’s. Both in empirical
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activities than mutuals, and that risk-taking is increased after conversion from
mutual  to  stock  organizational  form.  Similarly,  Karels  and  McClatchey
(1999) found no support for risk-taking behavior due to misguided incentives
emanating from deposit insurance in credit unions. Kane and Hendershott
(1996) agree that the organizational form of a credit union is responsible for
the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund (NCUSIF) not experiencing
a similar debacle as the FSLIC.
One  (theoretical)  explanation,  put  forward  by  Rasmussen  (1988)  is  that
managers  in  mutuals  cannot  gain  from  risky  strategies  due  to  their
remuneration contracts, and thus invest strictly in safe securities. On the other
hand, Esty (1997a) proposes that the key to understanding the difference
between risk taking at stock banks versus mutual banks is that in the latter,
residual and fixed claims are not strictly separated: depositors are owners as
well. This seemingly simple realization may be at the heart of the debate on the
corporate governance of banks: the frictions between regulator interest on the
one hand, and shareholder oriented corporate governance practice on the other
are removed once the separation of the financial interests becomes fuzzier.
2.3.4 Summary on bank regulators and managers
The  comparatively  scant  literature  relating  bank  regulation  directly  to
managerial  interests  has  yielded  three  important  conclusions.  First,
managerial equity stakes sufficient to entrench managers typically lead to
increased risk seeking, but is limited by charter value, and can be curtailed
through tighter regulation. Second, a direct link between management pay
contracts and risk taking has not been established, but there are indications
that regulatory influence has led to a reduced pay performance sensitivities of
bank  managers’ pay  packages.  This  may  indicate  regulatory  vigilance  to
curtail problems of equity inspired risk seeking of otherwise risk-averse bank
managers.
Third, and perhaps most importantly, the cooperative form may survive in
banking more so than in the rest of the economy because it has blurred the
boundaries  between  debt  and  equity,  and  has  thereby  reversed  the  most
polarizing  separation  of  bank  stakeholders.  As  a consequence,  mutually
organized banks seem to have been less of a burden to regulators and tax
payers  alike. This  observation  leads  us  directly  to  the  (even  more  scant)
literature examining regulator and shareholder influence on managers jointly.
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The empirical literature analyzing the competing interests of shareholders and
regulators on the behavior of bank managers is as of yet thin. Conceptually,
one  can  separate  the  task  at  hand  into  obtaining  information  about
management (monitoring), and influencing management (control). Out of the
question of monitoring by market participants and regulators arises the issue
whether the two groups can learn something from each other.
Originally, the literature posed the question, whether market participants had
the information at all in order to meaningfully judge the financial condition
of a bank. In part, this issue has already been addressed in the literature on
contagious  runs,  where  it  was  shown  that  runs  conveyed  information  to
market participants that influenced the assessment of institutions elsewhere.
Here, instead of examining quantity adjustments as in a run, we look at price
adjustments:  do  market  participants  distinguish  between  good  and  bad
financial institutions, and if so, do worse financial institutions pay higher
interest on their debt? This branch of the literature thus examines, whether
markets discipline poor financial institution performance.
Inasmuch as it relates to the contagion literature, ‘market discipline’ belongs
to the general literature on banks and their regulation. Yet, it was the survey
by Flannery (1998), which put market discipline at the heart of the debate on
the  corporate  governance  of  banks. Therefore,  market  discipline  is  rather
discussed  in  this  section.  After  examining  ‘monitoring’ of  financial
institutions, the attention will shift to ‘control’ in the second section.
2.4.1 Monitoring banks: market and regulatory efforts
The theoretical literature has identified the main problem of deposit insurance
as  well  as  capital  adequacy  regulation  with  deviations  from  market
perceptions, either in the pricing of insurance, or in the determination of
optimal capital structure. Thus, a proposal has been forwarded by Calomiris
(1999) not to abandon regulation, but to make it respond to market signals, in
particular the pricing of the most junior debt titles a financial institution has
issued
99.  Based  on  his  literature  survey,  Flannery  (1998)  argued  that
regulators could  benefit  from  market  information  by  shortening  the  time
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99 Also Llewellyn (2000) argued that regulatory and market structures may complement each
other. Lately, Benink and Wihlborg (2002) similarly called for an adjustment of Basle II.period from the inception of a problem at a financial institution to regulatory
action. Both recognition and response times could potentially be shortened.
For this proposal to have merits, market participants have to be able to infer
the financial condition of a bank from observable data, which stands squarely
against the notion of the opacity of bank financial statements. However, the
recent literature on market discipline comes out largely in favor of markets
pricing junior debt claims of financial institutions correctly.
Flannery and Sorescu (1996) examine debenture yields of US banks from
1983  to  1991  to  conclude  that  investors  were  definitively  capable  of
differentiating  among  the  risks  undertaken  by  banking  firms.  Park  and
Peristiani (1998) demonstrate a positive relationship between the risk of thrift
institutions  and  the  interest  rate  they  have  to  offer  to  attract  uninsured
deposits.  This  has  recently  been  corroborated  by  Goldberg  and  Hudgins
(2002). Jagtiani and Lemieux (2001) find that bond spreads start rising as
early  as  six  quarters  prior  to  financial  institution  failure,  making  them
potentially  valuable  signals  for  regulators.  Furfine  (2001a)  examines  the
federal funds market to conclude that interest rates paid there reflect credit
risk across borrowers. Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) examine Latin
American banks to conclude that depositors there discipline banks, which is
also mirrored in the findings by Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000). Finally,
Morgan and Stiroh (2001) compare bond spreads and banks’ asset structures
to find that investors do seem to price banks’ asset portfolio risks.
A central question in the literature is, whether the information contained in
market prices would actually add any information to what is already known
to regulators. Evanoff and Wall (2001) examine the relative merits of yield
spreads versus capital adequacy measures (now used for Prompt Corrective
Action,  or  PCA)  on  predicting  bank  condition  measured  as  subsequent
CAMEL or  BOPEC  ratings.  Indeed,  subordinated  debt  yield  spreads
performed slightly better than capital adequacy. Prediction errors are still
found to be relatively high.
Conversely, DeYoung, Flannery, Lang and Sorescu (2001) analyzed, whether
there also exists a reverse flow of information from regulators to market
participants. They found that there is indeed additional information created in
on-site  bank  examinations,  and  that  the  market  incorporates  negative
information into yield spreads of subordinated debt, albeit at a sometimes
significant time lag. The results are consistent with the studies by Berger and
Davies  (1998)  on  exams  at  banks,  and  Flannery  and  Houston  (1999)  or
Berger, Davies and Flannery (2000) on exams at bank holding companies.
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O’Neal (1998) show that banks relying more on deposits for financing display
larger negative returns after Moody’s downgrades. Also, riskier banks are
more likely to switch to deposit financing, thus evading market scrutiny.
More skeptical is an analysis by Gropp and Richards (2001), that documents
market reactions to rating changes of European banks. Here, bond prices
hardly reacted to ratings changes, while stock prices were usually reacting
according to prediction. Stock investors may learn something from ratings
changes, while bond investors do not. The authors speculate that the “Too-
big-to-fail” principle may be at fault in Europe. Possibly, the evidence is
reconciled by the findings of Gropp, Vesala and Vulpes (2001). They find
subordinated debt yields to be good predictors of default events shortly before
the  occurrence,  while  bail-out  expectations  seem  to  remove  the  signal  at
earlier times. Equity market based distance-to-default measures appear to be
more consistent. Curry, Elmer and Fissel (2001) analyze the use of stock
market indicators for regulatory purposes and find them more useful than
both rating downgrades as well as Call Report financial data.
Gilbert  and Vaughan  (2001)  are  more  skeptical  regarding  the  efficacy  of
market discipline in banks. They examine the effect of 87 public Federal
reserve announcements of enforcement actions (PCA) at banks, and compare
deposit withdrawals and interest rates at those banks over time and with a peer
group of institutions. Neither analysis suggests that depositors react strongly
to Fed action: neither in price (interest rate), nor in quantity (runs). More
cautiously,  Sundaresan  (2001)  argues  that  regulatory  responses  to  market
signals will alter the market signals themselves, thus prohibiting an approach
where supervision and regulation are put on ‘automatic pilot’.
Another  careful  analysis  results  from  the  recognition  that  not  all  banks’
subordinated  debt  markets  are  going  to  be  perfectly  liquid.  Hancock  and
Kwast (2001) advise ‘careful judgment’when interpreting such spreads. Also
Sironi  (2001)  documents  the  at  times  rather  illiquid  markets  in  the
subordinated notes and debenture issues of over 1800 European banks. It
appears that yield spreads may be only a coarse indicator for regulators for the
vast majority of small financial institutions.
Finally, Birchler and Maechler (2001) examine depositor preference for non-
insured savings accounts in Switzerland to conclude that depositors are not
well informed about the protection they are offered, or – alternatively – that
they may anticipate implicit insurance. There seems to be some consistency
in  the  latter  result  based  on  small  depositor  behavior  with  other  studies
Bank managers between shareholders and regulators: the empirical evidence 81mentioned above, especially Gilbert and Vaughan (2001). Nonetheless, while
it  is  perfectly  conceivable  that  the  average  citizen  does  not  spend  time
pondering the investment strategy in bank deposits, investors in active debt
markets do, and their behavior can reflect the underlying situation of the
bank. This can – in turn – provide a useful signal for action to regulators.
2.4.2 Market monitoring of banks: an assessment
The empirical literature on market versus regulatory monitoring has provided
some insights, but leaves some issues wanting. Most notably, the presumable
opacity of bank financial statements due to the illiquidity of bank loans is
squarely at odds with the evidence on market discipline. If market discipline
works so well, how do the market participants get the necessary information?
Apossible solution to the quagmire championed here is that financial markets
tend to be rather closely knit communities, and that information may just as
well  travel  unofficially  “through  the  grape  vine”  as  officially  through
financial statements. Then, market discipline can play a larger role to assist –
not  replace  –  regulators,  to  effect  timely  action  against  failing  banks,  as
suggested by Flannery (1998).
Only if bank financial statements could truly be shown to be less opaque
we could contemplate substituting some regulatory efforts by market means
to  motivate  bank  managers. This  poses  the  (empirical)  question,  whether
banks are truly unique in their asset structure. Similar to evidence on market
discipline, the evidence on loan securitization and loan syndication would
identify a large proportion of the overall assets originated by banks to be
salable, thus more liquid. Of course, banks may continue to be illiquid due to
the assets remaining on their books.
Then, the concept of ‘narrow’ and ‘free banking’ could possibly find higher
acceptance
100. Yet, Aghion, Bolton and Dewatripont (2000) warn that systemic
shocks may still increase the likelihood of contagious bank failures in free
banking systems. Still, information based runs would all but wiped out. Arecent
attempt at judging the concept of ‘narrow banking’, was performed in the survey
by Bossone (2001). He concluded that the benefits of a mandated system of
narrow banks were limited, while the costs in terms of financial sector efficiency
and credit availability could be crippling to real economic activity.
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100 Thomas (2001).Atruly Salomonic solution has been proposed by Mishkin (1999), who hopes
that  shifting  financial  institution  strategies  will  anyhow  increase  the
likelihood of a split of the sector in regular banks, which invest in illiquid
securities and finance themselves only in capital markets, and narrow banks,
which issue deposits, qualify for deposit insurance, but invest only in liquid
assets.
The case for narrow banking rests on a theoretical ideal of markets working
with few frictions. The empirical support for this model in banking is not
sufficient to generate policy responses with potentially far-reaching negative
consequences. Thus, also this study can only propagate narrow banking as an
option available to market participants. To introduce narrow banking as the
mandated norm would be frivolous.
2.4.3 Shareholder and regulator control over bank managers
Based on his extensive work researching market participants’ capacities to
assess  the  financial  condition  of  financial  institutions,  Flannery  (2001)
realizes  the  shortcoming  that  monitoring  banks  cannot  be  equated  with
influencing them. In Bliss and Flannery (2001), he finds evidence that the
reaction of banks to adverse market conditions does not necessarily translate
into policy or even management changes. This holds also for stockholder
monitoring,  which  is  directly  relevant  to  the  discussion  of  the  corporate
governance of banks.
The  comparative  merits  of  shareholder  and  regulator  control  of  financial
institutions was first examined by Prowse (1997a), who documented first of
all that the overall frequency of control changes in a sample of Bank Holding
Companies  he  examined  was  quite  comparable  to  that  found  by  Morck,
Shleifer and Vishny (1989) in industry, but that in banking more than half the
control changes were initiated by regulators, not shareholders
101.
Afirst reaction in terms of the theoretically derived governance policy of debt
and equity as displayed in figure one above would be that the findings by
Prowse (1997a) indicate a potentially significant failure of equity governance
on banks. While it is clear that certain shocks can be so large as to pierce both
activism  thresholds  at  the  same  time,  and  that  regulator  interests  take
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101 Prowse (1997a) equated a number 4 or 5 BOPEC rating with a control change.precedent at those times, a different interpretation would be that shareholders
cannot – or do not want to – play the final card of management replacement
in  a failed  venture.  Only  in  these  instances  we  would  see  such  a large
comparative role of regulator induced control changes. If shareholders had the
will or the ability to take such action when it is deemed necessary, shareholder
induced control changes would still be the norm.
A secondary assessment, however, would be to come back to the theory of
management,  and  note  that  management  appointment,  termination  and
replacement  are  procedures  that  defy  common  notions  of  rationality  or
optimality. Then, the findings by Prowse (1997a) could indicate that persons
farther removed from the process are more willing to take such action. Similar
to this interpretation, the incomplete contracting literature has come to see the
advantage of debt as being a hard budget constraint for management, since
control changes are rule-based rather than discretionary.
Whether regulatory vigilance is viewed as self-interested due to the insurance
promise to depositors, or as representing the long arm of depositors instituted
through the public choice mechanism, it is evidence of the principle of debt
governance as derived in chapter one.
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Given the above discussion of theoretical arguments and empirical insights,
what  is  one  to  recommend  to  policy  makers?  The  literature  has  already
emerged  into  a direction  that  one  size  cannot  fit  all.  Flannery  (1998),
Calomiris (1999) as well as Benink and Wihlborg (2002) make their cases for
improved market surveillance via publicly traded subordinated debentures
only for ‘large’ banks. What is their case to separate banks?
There  seems  to  be  mounting  evidence  that  there  is  a degree  of  market
segmentation  between  large  banks,  which  finance  predominantly  larger
clients,  and  small  local  banks,  which  finance  predominantly  SME’s. The
comparative  advantage  of  large  banks  to  finance  large  industry  is  easily
explained: large firms typically have many locations, and any single small
bank can only observe a location in its own neighborhood. To generate the
same  information  about  a large  borrower  that  a large  bank  with  many
locations would have access to, small banks would have to repeatedly form
lending  syndicates,  which  is  a prohibitively  costly  process
102. Thus,  large
banks have an information and thereby cost advantage to finance large firms.
But why would small banks have an advantage to finance small firms? Ferri
(1997)  argued  that  the  agency  problem  between  branch  managers  and
headquarters in a large bank constrains institutional information acquisition at
the local level. He favored this explanation to fit Italian data better than the
competing hypothesis that branch managers in large banks see their post only
as a temporary assignment. Also the analysis by Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales
(2002) is consistent with market segmentation between large and small banks
in Italy.
Berger  et  al.  (2002)  argued  that  the  financing  of  small  firms  demands
significantly more processing of ‘soft’information, and that small institutions
are  better  equipped  to  do  that.  Their  data  confirm  market  segmentation
between large and small banks for the USA. Accordingly, Sapienza (2002a)
finds that bank mergers tend to reduce the supply of loans to small firms.
85
102 Actually, the creation of Deutsche Bank in 1870 goes back to a decision of six private
banking houses to fund a common institution for large international financing ventures, in which
the six repeatedly found themselves in costly syndicate negotiations.Recently, Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) examine data consistent with
market segmentation between large and small banks in Argentina. With much
coarser data analysis, Harm (1992a) argues that such market segmentation
exists also in Germany.
Superficially  argued,  the  financing  of  small  firms  demands  a different
business  model,  different  management  requirements,  and  thereby  also
a different  governance  mode. A number  of  governance  elements  in  large
banks simply do not lend themselves well to an application in small banks, or
if they do, they may have a different valuation. If listed, small banks may be
easier targets for a takeover. Their management teams are compensated less,
and with lower pay-performance sensitivity, than their colleagues in large
banks
103. However, if they have an ownership stake in their bank, it is likely
to be much larger in relation to total capital than this would be the case in
large banks, i.e. they would be more easily ‘entrenched’. The cooperative
form of organization lends itself more to small than to large banks. Due to
limited access to capital and interbank markets, small banks typically have
lesser access to non-deposit forms of financing than large banks, and can be
expected to cause more regulatory effort and cost per insured deposit.
Overall, then, it does not make sense to design identical governance models
from the perspective of both shareholders and regulators for both small and
large banks. The following section is going to address governance concerns
principally for large banks. Agovernance model for small banks is introduced
in the following section. The third section argues that the empirical distinction
between large and small firms should not be mandated by regulators, but
should rather be the consequence of a self-selection mechanism in which
banks choose the regulatory regime that fits them best.
3.1 Governance mechanisms for shareholders and regulators
This chapter serves to merge the insights on the various mechanisms at the
disposal of bank shareholders and regulators to assess the merits of each such
mechanism for either group, and to make recommendations as to how they
may be combined with others to form a sensible regime for the governance
and regulation of banks.
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103 Ang, Lauterbach and Schreiber (2002).3.1.1 The safety net
The  first  element  to  be  examined  here  is  the  structure  of  the  safety  net
designed by official agencies to protect depositors. As discussed above, it
typically falls into two separate institutions: deposit insurance, which defines
a concrete claim against an insurer, and a lender-of-last-resort – typically
a central bank – which is not legally required to provide liquidity services to
all banks that seek them.
The point has been made repeatedly in the literature that both elements of the
safety  net  entail  the  danger  of  moral  hazard,  even  though  the  evidence
examining risk shifting due to mispriced deposit insurance is not unanimous.
Still, the deposit insurer and possibly the LOLR bear the residual loss from
a systemic crisis and have to devise mechanisms to protect themselves against
opportunistic behavior.
One way to look at the system is to treat deposit insurance and LOLR as two lines
of defense, one contractual – or rule based – and one discretionary. The problem
with deposit insurance is that in the event of a systemic crisis, the insurer is most
likely overburdened with the claims made against it. For example, Goodhart
(1988) invokes the issue of credibility against a private deposit insurer.
However, once we look at isolated bank failures, then deposit insurance is
credible, and the private insurance option becomes feasible, even though it
will have to be underwritten by the government for the event of a systemic
crisis.
Thus, the first proposal is for bank regulators to allow privately organized
deposit insurance. Since the government still underwrites the residual in case
of  a systemic  crisis,  the  deposit  insurance  must  be  regulated  by  the
government and conform to certain standards. However, the ‘first line of
defense’ is put into the hands of the private sector, and it is likely that the
contract between deposit insurer and bank comes as close to market terms as
possible. Thus, concerns about deposit insurance subsidies are reduced.
As an additional feature, banks could be asked to organize deposit insurance
from their own ranks in a mutual organization, as is the case in Germany
104.
The added benefit from such a structure is that banks are themselves equipped
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scheme.best to understand each others’risk positions. Therefore, a mutually organized
deposit insurance fund under government regulation contains elements of
credibility and continuing government oversight, but also peer monitoring
and private sector organization. This could improve the efficiency of the first
line of defense, while still warding off irrational runs.
Obviously, since the government still underwrites the private insurance fund
de facto, it is indispensable that it should regulate or at least “accredit” the
insurance  fund  with  the  objective  that  the  insurance  promise  issued  to
depositors is credible even in large but isolated bank crises. Elements of
accreditation could spell out necessary fund size relative to insured deposits,
or size of the fund to the largest or largest few institutions in terms of insured
deposits. As  an  added  element  of  enforcing  competition  and  institutional
creativity, the approach favored here would rely more on accreditation of the
insurance  fund  rather  than  permanent  supervision  by  national  authorities.
Accreditation would leave open the option of an internationally organized
deposit  insurance  scheme  for  the  largest  banks  in  the  world,  which  is
recognized by all nations with participant banks.
This is desirable, since the size distribution of large banking institutions in
many countries leave an insurance fund rather lop-sided. In England, a fund
for privately owned financial institutions would likely contain six large banks
and not much else. Thus, any catastrophe in one bank would be a sever strain
on the five others. In Germany, Holtorf and Rudolf (1999) report that at the
end of 1998, 4 banks accounted for some 40% of all insured deposits in the
fund  for  German  credit  institutions,  while  the  size  of  the  fund  itself  is
estimated at about 1% of insured deposits. Any one failure would thus have
the potential to completely overburden the system, and the element of public
underwriting is highly visible.
Thus, the proposal sponsored here is for those 100 to 200 banks in Europe and
North  America,  which  anyway  meet  each  other  time  and  again  in  the
syndicate  loan  market,  and  have  a lot  of  exposure  to  each  other,  and
knowledge about each other, to create an international deposit insurance fund
that  can  be  credible  even  for  the  largest  institutional  failures.  Of  course,
national regulators would have to permit that all institutions supporting the
fund would have a call option to take over a delinquent bank. Realistically,
therefore, one would think that in today’s political environment, there would
be only banks from a few countries willing and allowed to join such an
international fund, but – if one can achieve a feasible size from the beginning
– growth and acceptance over time would likely follow. The design of such
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developed in coordination between those banks that would see a benefit from
such a system, national regulators, and the BIS, in a discussion round similar
to the current debate on Basle II.
It must be stressed that such a system can only be a first line of defense. For
that limited purpose, also Goodhart (1988) could see a role for privatized
deposit insurance. In a sense, a systemic crisis cannot be insured against,
since the system is affected as a whole. The only thing a government can do
is to prevent an undesirable distribution of who shoulders the overall loss.
This is done via the fiscal budget under government underwritten deposit
insurance,  or  via  the  inflationary  mechanism  under  liquidity  provision
through the LOLR in a systemic crisis.
A combination of privately organized and regulated deposit insurance and
government  responsibility  in  the  event  of  a systemic  crisis  would  also
preserve the element of ‘constructive ambiguity’, which is often mentioned as
an efficiency enhancing feature of an LOLR
105. The government can choose
the form of intervention in a systemic crisis. In a way, the EU currently has
a system of this nature, even though typically not with privately organized
deposit insurance. However, the ECB has not officially been endowed with
any responsibility for bank supervision and regulation, nor liquidity provision
as an LOLR. Yet, it remains to be seen, if the system is strong enough to
prevent monetization of bad debt in a major banking crisis in a member
country. Thus, constructive ambiguity has truly been built into the system, at
least until the first crisis.
3.1.2 Capital structure and regulation: a self-selecting regime
Since a fully credible deposit insurance mechanism would have to confer
a legal right to the depositor while at the same time covering all eventualities,
governments  will  always  bear  the  residual  loss  in  systemic crises
106.
Therefore, regulation will continue to be necessary, and banks will have to
live with justified claims for appropriate capitalization, supervisor audits, and
possibly regulator induced control changes.
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106 Else, the deposit insurance contract would have to stipulate, how awards would be rationed
in case of the insufficiency of the fund due to systemic crises. This would be an obvious example
of an incomplete contract, and thus represent a non-credible insurance scheme.The experiences of the 1988 Basle guidelines for risk based capital adequacy
measures  have  recently  triggered  the  widely  debated  proposals  for
adjustments, known as Basle II. The current framework proposes a three pillar
system
107 based on bank internal ratings
108 for risk classification, expanded
active  supervision,  and  more  market  discipline  based  on  improved
information disclosure. To many academics, the market pillar does not go far
enough, and thus there have been several proposals to demand that banks
issue credibly uninsured subordinated debt. Observed yield spreads on such
debt could then be used by regulators to assess the necessity for bank audits.
The literature on market discipline as discussed above has largely come out
in favor of using sub debt yield spreads as an additional source of information
for all interested parties, including regulators.
This has most recently prompted a call by Benink and Wihlborg (2002) that
issuance of credibly uninsured subordinated debt be mandated in the first
phase of Basle II at least for a feasible subset of all banks
109. Also a study
performed by the Federal Reserve Board (1999) has concluded that sub debt
would improve on market discipline, but the study recognizes that to some
institutions,  “mandatory  issuance  would  impose  a penalty  for  risk-taking
beyond the penalty associated with not issuing SND” (p. 23).
The problem concerns rationing of funds in public debt markets: what type of
claims will find a buyer, and which claims could not be placed at reasonable
cost. The FRB (1999) study indicates that the market’s appetite for risky bank
debt changes over time (p. 20). Let us suppose, we would have identified
a feasible  set  of  financial  institutions  that  are  in  the  position  to  issue
subordinated  debt  claims.  In  an  environment  of  deteriorating  economic
conditions, the marginal institutions could be squeezed out of liquid markets.
What is a regulator to do in this situation? The contract between regulator and
regulated institution has become incomplete.
The  regime  favored  here  does  not  involve  mandatory  issuance  of
subordinated debt, which would only lead to arguments between banks and
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processes rather than results. They do, however, leave ample scope for ‘gaming and manipulation’.
109 A theoretical argument against mandatory sub debt issuance would be the possibility that
sub debt owners would not exit upon rapid deterioration of the bank’s perceived asset quality
because sub debt owners might opt for staying in with management and gamble for resurrection.
However, the available empirical evidence would note attach a great likelihood to such occurrence
or behavior. I am indebted to Maria Soledad Martinez Peria for this insight.regulators, on whether issuance of notes at a particular point in time would
have overburdened the institution or not. The regime favored here involves
self-selection of regulated institutions into one of three regulatory regimes.
The default for each bank is to have no subordinated debt, and be placed in
a ‘tough’ regulatory category. This could involve frequent audits in order to
compensate for the lack of market information, and a number of regulatory
covenants  being  imposed  on  bank  managers  and  bank  shareholders. This
might even take the form of regulators being allowed to veto compensation
packages, if they are deemed inconsistent with bank prudence.
If, however, the bank achieves placement of subordinated notes in the capital
markets, and thereby conveys additional information to regulators, the audit
frequency can be reduced. Thereby, capital market costs may be increased,
but regulatory costs would be reduced. It would be the responsibility of each
individual institution to balance the costs of either regime at the margin.
Obviously, those banks that would never have access to capital markets – the
small  local  banks  –  would  be  faced  with  greater  costs  and  a potential
competitive  disadvantage  in  this  regime.  The  next  section  describes
a regulatory regime for small banks involving an appropriately structured
clearinghouse that could help preserve small local banks without imposing
additional regulatory burdens on them.
A thorny issue for regulators would be the question of charter value. The
empirical studies discussed above have concluded with rare exception that
higher  charter  values  are  associated  with  bank  behavior  viewed  as  more
beneficial by regulators. At the same time, charter value is shareholder value,
and thereby viewed favorably by shareholders. The pitfall is that attempts by
regulators to create charter value – for example through regulated interest
margins – have fallen out of favor, since they are viewed in the long run to lead
to more institutional slack and cost inefficiencies rather than successful banks.
There remains, however, the possibility for regulators set up an incentive
mechanism as to reward higher charter value rather than create it. This could
again be achieved by defining different regulatory regimes with differing
regulatory intensities, and thereby differing regulatory cost. Institutions with
higher charter value would then be rewarded with lower regulatory costs.
As a first step in gaining experience with the new Basle guidelines, we are
here  favoring  an  equilibrium,  where  banks  self-select  into  one  of  three
regulatory  regimes,  one  for  large  banks  with  public  subordinated  debt
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clearinghouse structure, and one for the remainder. In addition, regulators
should have the freedom to set up structures to incentivize banks to work
towards more successful operations generating higher charter value.
3.1.3 Financial institution mergers
While  it  is  clear  that  the  market  for  corporate  control  is  a market  of
managerial control over corporate assets, it is by no means clear that observed
corporate control contests imply an improvement of the situation in the eyes
of  shareholders.  This  is  so,  because  the  control  contest  itself  may  be
motivated by improper objectives, e.g. Michael Jensen’s (1986) ‘free cash
flow’ problem. On top of that there are a wealth of other reasons that may
explain observed mergers so that a positive corporate governance role is but
one explanatory variable. For the US evidence, we could conclude above that
the very active merger activity in the banking industry was triggered to a large
extent  by  regulatory  change  that  enabled  institutions  to  either  exhaust
opportunities  for  geographic  diversification  not  available  before,  or  to
consolidate operations in “overbanked” areas. The latter motive would also
apply to many domestic mergers in Europe.
Only the consolidating merger type could carry a governance interpretation.
Notably, this is equally true for regulators and shareholders. The merger of
competing financial institutions could be an attempt at strengthening these
institutions in a particular area, and is thereby a primary tool for regulators
faced with potential banking problems in such areas. Going back to Manne
(1965), mergers can be seen as an institution avoiding bankruptcy costs in
imperfect capital markets plagued by a variety of frictions. Certainly, this
diagnosis holds for the market environment of banks. Appropriately, then,
bank mergers can be a meaningful element in the tool set of regulators.
The exact mechanics of the use of this tool would be dependent on the exact
nature of bank regulation in the respective country. The recommendation for
the US system, which has been described at length in this study, would be that
regulators would reserve the right to order financial institutions to merge at
a CAMEL or BOPEC rating of 3 or lower
110. One could also envision that at
a BOPEC or CAMEL rating of 3, regulators and shareholders jointly decide
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below,  when  talking  about  supervision  in  a board  of  directors.  In  other
countries, financial institutions mergers effecting a beneficial consolidation
could also be achieved more informally via moral suasion.
Of course, there is absolutely no reason to restrict mergers based on the
evidence presented above, so that if there is a need for disciplinary takeovers,
they should be able to proceed if there are no major regulatory or antitrust
concerns. The focal point of this section lay in the recognition that financial
institution mergers can be an important regulatory tool.
3.1.4 Management ownership stakes
One of the thorny issues in bank governance concerns the appropriate role of
equity  in  the  bank’s balance  sheet.  While  private  ownership  is  the  most
fundamental building block of a modern market economy, especially the case
of banking is more subtle. Anumber of theoretical studies reviewed in section
1.4.3. had concluded that – all too often – uninhibited equity interests were
a problem, and part of the challenge was, how to contain them.
Thus, on top of the well-known problem of managerial entrenchment to the
detriment  of  small  shareholders,  also  depositors  and  regulators  are  more
likely to suffer from an equity linked externality when managers hold too
many shares. The corporate governance literature was rather unanimous in its
verdict  that  entrenched  management  is  not  too  desirable.  The  case  for
regulators is more mixed, but also here a suspicion prevails that too much
equity ownership on the side of management may lead to excessive risk-
taking.
Yet, the studies have also shown that charter value as well as active and
efficient supervision can reduce the problem of risk-shifting due to perverse
incentives given to management. The irony of management stakes in banks is
that  –  while  normally  the  removal  of  management  incentives  from
shareholders is viewed as a problem – the natural risk aversion of managers
is here actually welcomed by regulators. Large management equity stakes
tend to neutralize this stance.
It has never seemed like good policy to discourage the owner-managed firm,
since it has often proven to be the most dynamic force in an economy. The
case of banking is different. Here, the private banking houses have all but
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too large to be owned by individuals. At the local level, private banking
houses in many countries have not managed to compete with public sector
savings institutions, or cooperatives. Some empirical work cited above has
actually established elements of superiority of the latter type of institutions.
Only in the US, a history of fragmentation through regulation has preserved
the institution of the private banker. Recent deregulation moves have made
the survival of this institution more difficult.
Thus, it would not come as a great loss to discourage very large management
equity stakes, say to the order of 25% of total capital and above. An outright
prohibition, though, would seem to place too much of a burden on businesses
currently structured in this very manner. Thus, the resolution proposed here is
to communicate to such banks that high management equity stakes would
increase regulatory supervision efforts.
Most notably important of such a solution is that it preserves the issuance of
small  shares  of  total  capital  to  bank  managers  for  motivation  purposes.
Coupled with sales restrictions, bank equity awards are actually providing bank
managers incentives consistent with long-term value maximization. As this
would be synonymous with the creation and management of charter value, it is
ultimately also in the interest of regulators, who – as reasoned above – would
reward institutions of higher charter value with less regulatory burdens.
3.1.5 Management incentives and remuneration
This discussion leads directly to the topic of appropriate incentives for bank
managers. On the downside, Macey and O’Hara (2001) had argued in favor of
expanding the fiduciary duties of bank managers to depositors. On the upside,
the most thought through proposal available in the literature at this point is
contained in the model by John, Saunders and Senbet (2000) as discussed in
chapter one: managers would receive an aggressive but capped bonus plus
a small equity participation. This would lead to a concave section in the
management evaluation function that generates the desired risk-aversion, and
regulatory action incorporating the observed pay schedule would incentivize
owners to actually create such a pay schedule in the first place.
While  this  structure  carries  the  appeal  of  simplistic  elegance,  there  are
a number of objections that can be raised. Probably the strongest complaint
would  be  based  on  the  notion  that  a bank  that  has  been  faced  with  an
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function is actually convex rather than concave, and that management would
now have even greater incentives to gamble for resurrection.
Secondly, the proposal to link FDIC policy to the structure of the management
remuneration contract may be economically creative, but probably a long shot
from a legal point of view. The versatility of remuneration contracts is only
limited by human creativity. Aproposal to limit this variety to a structure that
the FDIC can incorporate into a regulatory contract does not seem likely.
Also, the proposal intended owners of banks to have the correct incentive to
set the appropriate managerial pay schedule. This presumes that owners can
actually do that, or that they do that in normal corporations. The recent study
by Bebchuk et al. (2001) questions that mechanism. In their interpretation,
actually observed management contracts are better explained by managerial
rent-seeking rather than contracts optimal from an agency point of view.
Thus,  remuneration  contracts  entailing  “immediate  gratification”  would
arguably be too vulnerable to abuse, in banks to the additional detriment of
depositors on top of shareholders. The proposal favored here would go in
a different direction.
First of all, the proposal here shares the ideas contained in John, Saunders and
Senbet (2000) to the extent that regulatory and shareholder interests should be
reflected  in  the  managerial  pay  schedule.  Thus,  regulatory  scrutiny  of
management  remuneration  contracts  is  desirable,  even  to  the  point  of
regulatory interception of structures deemed too likely to pronounce rather
than soften the incentive conflict between debt and equity.
The proposal for the content of management remuneration is to treat current
performance  as  a signal  worthy  of  gratification,  but  not  necessarily  with
a strong current cash flow component. The last subsection mentioned equity
stakes  with  a sales  restriction. Another  possibility  would  be  to  translate
current  performance  based  bonuses  not  into  cash,  but  for  example  into
pension promises written against the banking firm. While the recent collapse
of Enron and US ERISAlegislation would arguably curtail such proposals for
the US, in Germany, for example, such a practice is feasible and within the
confines of common corporate pension practice: a mutually organized rescue
fund insures the pension promises of all beneficiaries.
The market for managers demands that firms have the chance to recruit the
talents  they  need  to  fill  their  top  positions.  Certainly,  banks  cannot  be
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management compensation have clouded the notion that actually contracted
management  packages  are  best  explained  through  efficiency  arguments.
A modest proposal here would be to encourage the use of regulatory clout to
shift managerial incentives via feasible remuneration packages towards long-
term conservative value creation.
There is a stronger objection to relying on spelled-out incentive remuneration
coming out of motivation crowding theory as proposed by Frey (1997), or Frey
and Jegen (2001): detailed rules of what is to be achieved and how it is to be
rewarded may crowd out intrinsic motivation. Interestingly, the same problem
has been recorded by Simpson, as quoted by Llewellyn (2000), for the relation
between regulators and banks: “In a market which is heavily regulated for
internal standards of integrity, the incentives to fair dealings diminish. Within the
company culture, such norms to fair dealings as ‘the way we do things around
here’would eventually be replaced by ‘it’s OK if we can get away with it’.
3.1.6 The board of directors
The  board  of  directors  is  more  of  a discretionary,  hands-on  device  for
strategic decision-making, and therefore does not lend itself well to rule-
based procedures so typical of government behavior. Yet, in the process of
bank  supervision,  regulators  have  learnt  that  also  they  have  to  react  to
unexpected on-site contingencies. The proposal here includes an intermittent
phase between laissez-faire and institution closure, where bank regulators
would start interacting with the board of directors.
This proposal grows out of the theoretical discussion on debt governance, and
may be seen as the equivalent of a Chapter 11 procedure to banking. In
Chapter 11, management may make a restructuring proposal, and creditors get
to vote on the proposal. Only in Chapter 7 are the assets of an institution
transferred totally to creditors.
I would envision that regulators should have a right to participate in a bank
restructuring proposal at the board level when the financial condition of the
institution has deteriorated sufficiently. In the US, this could be a number 3
CAMEL or BOPEC rating after an audit in a bank or bank holding company.
The initiative for the policies aimed at turning the company around would still
be originating from the shareholders side, but as this happens typically in an
environment of weakening financial strength, the incentives to gamble for
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interest to be able to control, and if necessary veto, a proposal.
The  structure  envisioned  here  would  allow  regulatory  access  to  the
boardroom at the first signs of trouble, and thereby act in a timely manner –
if only passively – to prevent further decay of the institution, which has often
generated the capacity for increasingly perverse management incentives.
3.1.7 Ownership structure and owner identity
The  strongest  results  generated  in  the  literature  on  beneficial  ownership
structures of financial institutions are the positive experiences with mutual
banks. The principal reason for this was argued to be the identity of depositor
and owner, which would confer just the right incentives on management to
promote  long-term  value  creation  without  free-riding  on  creditors  and
regulators.
I have  argued  above  that  in  the  special  case  of  banks,  the  natural
disadvantages  of  the  mutual  form  of  organization  may  be  more  than
compensated  for  by  eliminating  the  tensions  between  shareholders  and
regulators. This may explain the success of the mutual form of organization
in banking relative to other industries.
From a policy perspective, however, this is of only limited value. First of all,
the cooperative form thrives particularly in small and local institutions, and
only generates larger structures by pyramiding. These central institutions in
a cooperative network show only limited comparison with large stock banks
so that this corporate form finds its proper place of discussion in the next
section on governance and regulation in small banks.
Yet, the one important policy implication of the extant literature in this area
is not to discourage the mutual form in banking due to some intellectual
arguments on hypothetical governance deficits: in the special case of banking,
the cooperative form has a governance advantage.
Other ownership forms have been discussed only to a limited extent in the
literature. The study by LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2002) has
come out strongly against government ownership of banks in developing
countries. In developed countries, the issue is more one of subsidization when
the good faith and credit of the government is standing behind a financial
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markets. Whether the documented success of public savings institutions in
some countries can be traced to this government subsidy that mainly accrues
to their clearinghouse banks remain an issue for further research. Another
caveat regarding public ownership of banks in developed countries is the
inherent danger of politically motivated lending decisions. This hypothesis is
unfortunately supported by Sapienza (2002b) for Italian data.
What can be said about ownership in financial institutions, however, is that
any polarization of the conflict of interest between debt and equity will need
to  be  avoided.  However,  this  concerns  all  the  governance  mechanisms
typically  invoked  as  favorable  in  the  mainstream  corporate  governance
literature. For the issue of ownership this means that any strong ownership
voice leads to exaggerated conflicts between shareholders and regulators.
Thus,  it  is  no  longer  clear  whether  we  would  like  to  see  Carl  Icahn  at
Citibank, or CalPERS making its voice heard at the shareholder meeting of
Bank of America. While the empirical evidence on the positive impacts of
large  shareholders  and  institutional  investors  in  firms  is  still  mixed,  in
banking even the theoretical case is weak.
Thus, widely held ownership would be the ideal form for banks. Yet, this
makes the shareholders more vulnerable due to the bank-endemic governance
problem. This in turn would increase the cost of capital for banks. Bank
stocks  would  be  less  attractive  than  industry  stocks.  Under  perfect
competition, this would be a puzzle, because it is not clear that bank stock
would  be  purchased  in  equilibrium.  One  potential  avenue  to  restore
equilibrium is to think of oligopolistic structures that preserve some charter
value even for the marginal institution and even in the absence of regulated
barriers to entry. I have shown elsewhere
111 that financial markets display
strong tendencies for concentration.
Thus, it could be reconciled that bank shareholders with only limited governance
recourse to their management are still interested in purchasing bank stock.
3.1.8 A consistent portfolio of governance mechanisms
To summarize, the shared responsibility between owners and regulators of
large banks would ideally show the following features:
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111 Harm (2001).– Aprivately organized – possibly international – deposit insurance fund for
individual crises that  is  accredited  by  regulators.  Banks  select  an
accredited fund, or a national fund organized by the public sector.
– Governments  stand  behind  the  system  with  an  LOLR  for  the  case  of
a systemic crisis only to avert an unwanted distribution of the common
loss. For this, there exists the option of a fiscal or an inflationary burden.
Due to the distributional nature of the task, it has to be addressed in the
national polity.
– Regulators impose risk-based capital adequacy norms based on banks own
ratings,  where  regulators  only  check  the  adequacy  of  procedures,  not
results.
– Banks can self-select into a regulatory regime by issuing subordinated
debt or not. The regulatory burden for institutions that provide market
information to regulators is reduced.
– Regulators encourage the creation of charter value, but do not intend to
create it themselves.
– Shareholders control a governance infrastructure that is compromised by
regulator interests.
i. Institutions  with  large  blockholders  –  especially  managers  –  face
a more activist regulatory regime.
ii. Regulators  can  influence,  if  not  veto,  management  remuneration
arrangements that are seen as detrimental to depositor interests. Long-
term  benefits  written  against  the  banking  firm  are  more  incentive
compatible than short-term cash benefits.
iii. In  an  environment  of  deteriorating  financial  conditions,  regulators
participate in the decision-making process in the board of directors
similar to a Chapter 11 process. In times of increasing incentives for
risk-shifting,  regulators  must  be  able  to  veto  potentially  harmful
restructuring  proposals,  while  shareholders  must  maintain  the
initiative for the corporate turn-around.
iv. In such situations, regulators could propose institution mergers for the
purpose  of  industry  consolidation  to  the  boards  of  the  institutions
involved. In worse financial conditions – i.e. CAMEL or BOPEC 4 or
5  ratings  in  the  USA,  regulators  have  the  right  to  mandate  such
institution mergers as they see fit.
Such an environment would provide the beginning of a solution, in which the
frictions created by the highly levered capital structures of today’s banks
would hopefully be reduced to a minimum.
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The proposal for large banks has obvious limitations for small banks. Here,
atomistic ownership is less natural. Managerial equity shares – if they are
meant to be comparable with competitive offers from larger institutions – are
likely to be sizeable. Non-listed banks cannot give equity-linked incentives at
all,  be  they  shares  or  options.  Finally,  small  institutions  are  likely  to  be
disadvantaged  in  their  access  to  capital  markets,  thus  compromising
initiatives that attempt to require mandatory issuance of subordinated debt.
From a regulatory perspective, it is likely to be much more labor intensive to
supervise one thousand institutions with $100 million in insured deposits
each, rather than one institution with $100 billion in insured deposits.
Thus, it pays to contemplate a separate solution for small banks.
The solution proposed here involves a decentralization of regulatory activity
by  relying  on  debt  governance  at  a more  decentralized  level  to  enforce
depositor interests.
This is achieved in structures like the German system of cooperative banks or
public savings banks, but also in US bank holding companies. To describe the
German  systems,  they  all  have  central  institutions  that  function  as
clearinghouses to their hundreds of members. The clearinghouses manage the
aggregate  system  liquidity,  and  thereby  also  act  as  an  LOLR  to  member
banks. Also, the systems run their own deposit insurance funds, although
Holtorf and Rudolf (1999) view them as insufficient.
In return for the liquidity promise and the deposit guarantee, however, the
central institutions have an audit and a governance privilege. They consult
individual  member  institutions  on  audit  standards,  and  have  the  right  to
initiate audits when necessary. In extreme cases, they have the authority to
take over the delinquent institution, and replace its management.
This  system  combines  many  features  described  as  desirable  above:  the
common  deposit  insurance  funds  provoke  peer  monitoring.  The  central
institution  has  debt  governance  interests,  but  full  access  to  a governance
infrastructure  typically  associated  with  equity  interests.  This  is  possible,
because in both public sector savings banks as well as cooperative banks the
typical equity interests have been removed, either by aligning depositor and
owner interests, or by overlaying normal equity interests with public sector
objectives.  The  result  is  a structure,  in  which  the  enforcement  of  debt
100 Policy recommendationsgovernance incentives has credibly been decentralized to the level of the
system’s clearinghouse.
Nonetheless,  the  German  regulators  still  insist  on  auditing  small  banks
embedded in such a system, but it is clear that the likelihood of getting caught
in  a systemic  crisis  involving  such  small  institutions  has  largely  been
curtailed.
The proposal for other countries here would be to rely again on a regime of
self-selection: small banks anyhow have a competitive disadvantage by being
less able to tap capital markets. By being embedded in a system of small
banks with a central institution that does have access to the capital markets,
small banks overcome this disadvantage – albeit at the expense of “freedom”
due to the legitimate governance interests of the central institution. On a net
basis, however, the advantages of system membership should outweigh the
disadvantages.
Then, regulators could create a less stringent regulatory regime for those
small institutions, which opt to self-select into a credible governance network.
As mentioned before, a US bank holding company with many decentralized
banking  subsidiaries  may  be  viewed  as  such  an  institution,  and  no  new
regulatory regime would need to be created. Of course, no attempt to force
existing independent small banks into selling itself to a BHC under regulatory
pressure is also no answer. Yet, smaller banks need to understand that they
have to internalize the higher regulatory costs they create. Regulators should
rather  encourage  the  creation  of  systems  of  small  banks  connected  via
a common clearing house, although this would be difficult, if not impossible,
if any number of the small banks are competing with each other in the same
regions.
3.3 Who is small, and who is large?
What should have been communicated by now is that the regulatory regime
would ideally be characterized by self-selection.
Every  system  needs  a default  option.  Such  default  option  would  be
established as an activist regulatory regime, and a government run deposit
insurance scheme. The terms of such a scheme should be harsh with respect
to the number of audits, restrictions on institution ownership, restrictions on
management share ownership and remuneration contracts, and broad powers
Policy recommendations 101to use the board of directors of faltering financial institutions to turn banks
around in the interest of depositors.
Banks need to know that they can opt out of the harsh regime in two ways.
For  one,  large  banks  can  tap  the  capital  markets  regularly  by  issuing
subordinated debt claims. The regulators reward this provision of market
information with greater leniency. In addition, large banks may escape the
public  deposit  insurance  fund  by  joining  an  accredited  (international?)
privately organized fund. Small institutions have the choice of embedding
themselves  in  a system  of  small  banks  that  are  characterized  by  debt
governance  oriented  clearinghouses,  which  provide  access  to  the  capital
markets for the small banks, while at the same time receiving far-reaching
governance privileges in return.
In the ideal world, the default option would no longer be used.
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This  study  has  examined  the  peculiar  governance  situation  of  banks.
Governance in general is argued to be a set of mechanisms with which the
providers  of  capital,  and  possibly  other  stakeholders,  are  defending  their
interest against the firm. The firm, in turn, is run by managers, and this is
where the problems start: the management position can only be derived with
recourse  to  a model  of  man,  which  defies  traditional  assumptions  of
economic rationality. In turn, the governance of the firm can also be only
a rather crude measure of supervision. Yet, some accountability framework
for managers is most definitively desirable. One must only be aware of its
limitations.
An important result deriving from the analysis of the management function
that  equally  holds  for  all  governance  concerns  is  the  recognition  that
management is the prime institution entrusted with the governance of firms,
also  banking  firms.  Thus,  the  default  option  has  to  be  one  of  trust.
Shareholder governance and regulator concerns become relevant only when
the  primary  institution  of  management  is  deemed  to  have  failed.  In  this
situation,  the  first  institution  to  impose  corrective  devices  must  be
shareholders,  since  they  are  still  bearing  the  residual  losses.  Only  after
continued deterioration regulators would be phased in gradually, not unlike in
a Chapter 11 framework.
The empirical literature examining the effectiveness of individual corporate
governance mechanisms has not yet come up with a smoking gun. Only as of
late, studies by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2001) and by Klapper and Love
(2002) make use of governance indices to examine performance effects of the
overall governance regime. The study by Gompers et al. (2001) identifies
a potential of excess returns of 8.5% p.a. through the 1990’s by shorting stock
of firms with poor shareholder rights and investing in stocks with strong
shareholder rights. This is implausibly large, but the extent of the impact of
governance may be exaggerated due to an exogeneity problem. The study by
Klapper and Love (2002) examines firms in emerging markets to find that
a one standard deviation improvement in a governance index yields a one
sixth standard deviation improvement in Tobin’s Q, which is more plausible
for a governance performance effect.
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wishes to contribute to this search for the special case of banks. It is derived
that  bank  regulation  finds  its  origins  in  the  governance  interests  of  debt
owners, where in banks depositors have delegated their monitoring rights to
the government via the public choice mechanism. The interplay between debt
and equity governance is explored, yielding the common insight that equity
governance  should  be  more  agile,  while  debt  governance  focuses  on
situations  of  financial  distress,  including  the  potential  for  such  distress
through risk shifting activities.
The essay has provided a survey of the extant empirical literature both on the
effect of individual governance mechanisms as employed in banking, as well
as the empirical literature on bank regulation. It is shown that the competing
nature of debt and equity interests on management has been largely neglected
until recently, when it became part of conventional wisdom that both broad
interests form part of the overall governance regime of the banking firm.
The state of knowledge as defined by the discussion of the existing empirical
literature was used to formulate policy recommendations for an internally
consistent governance regime of banks. Such regime would increase the role
of  market  monitoring  mechanisms  were  feasible,  and  would  open  the
governance infrastructure normally reserved for shareholders to regulators in
more troubled financial institutions.
Debt  governance  for debt  market  participants,  shareholders  and
management
a) Instead of government run deposit insurance, government accreditation of
privately organized deposit insurance is recommended as a ‘first line of
defense’ primarily  against  individual  institution  failure.  The  private
schemes are ideally organized as mutuals owned by participating banks in
order to increase incentives for mutual monitoring.
b) Private deposit insurance schemes in many countries are going to be ‘lop-
sided’ since very few large banks are going to account for a large amount
of total insured deposits. I recommend that the 100 to 200 largest banks in
the world, who know each other intricately from the syndicate loan market
anyway, mutually organize an international deposit insurance fund under
the auspices of national regulators as well as the BIS in a process not
unlike the current debate over Basle II.
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international  deposit  insurance  mutual  should  get  a call  option  on  the
capital of institutions that need to be bailed out by this fund. It is not clear,
whether  all  national  regulators  would  allow  foreign  ownership  of
prominent institutions in their jurisdiction. Asecondary concern is that the
departure  of  the  highest  quality  institutions  from  national  DI  schemes
would  expose  the  current  cross-subsidization  between  institutions,  and
thereby expose the fund to higher risks in the remaining sample. This may
not be in the interest of the national regulator.
d) The  lender-of-last-resort  remains  a government  task  to  smoothen
politically infeasible distributional consequences in systemic crises.
e) The call in the recent literature for the issuance of uninsured subordinated
debt by banks is supported, yet not as a mandatory requirement, but by
way  of  a regulatory  framework  that  allows  banks  to  self-select  into
different regimes. A mandatory requirement risks the contract between
bank and regulators to be rendered incomplete when the market would not
accept an issue by some bank.
f) Small banks, that are unlikely to tap capital markets in the near future are
encouraged to organize a new or join an existing system of small banks
structured around a large clearinghouse in the center. The clearinghouse
bank  provides  liquidity  to  the  member  banks  and  obtains  substantial
governance  rights  in  return.  To  the  regulator,  this  represents
a decentralization  of  debt  governance,  and  is  rewarded  with  a more
‘lenient’ regulatory regime similar to that provided for banks that issue
uninsured subordinated debt. Again, banks self-select into a regulatory
regime.
g) The conflict of interest between shareholders and depositors of a bank can
also  be  mitigated  by  making  sure  that  everyone  is  both.  This  is  the
advantage of cooperatives. I argue that the survival of the cooperative
form in banking is so much more pronounced than in other industries,
because financial cooperatives address the specific governance dilemma
faced by banks. Weakening shareholder instincts seems to be an advantage
for the overall performance of banks. However, I do not advocate special
support  for  financial  mutuals,  but  rather  call  for  regulators  looking
favorably on the cooperatives instead of fighting them for a presumed
governance deficit.
h) I join the call by Macey and O’Hara to also transplant creditor interests to
the  managerial  level  by  extending  the  concept  of  fiduciary  duty  to
depositors.
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1. Preventative measures (ex ante)
Regulators  must  have  the  ability  to  prevent  arrangements  between  bank
shareholders  and  their  managers  that  needlessly  accentuate  rather  than
attenuate conflicts of interest with regulators. The following elements may be
contemplated:
a) Ownership restrictions. Unadulterated equity interests can lead to perverse
incentives due to the call option feature of equity. The aggressive pursuit
of  shareholder  value  concerns  can  lead  to  incentives  to  ‘gamble  for
resurrection’. Therefore, the most suitable ownership form next to the
cooperative for a bank is widely held ownership. Any concentrated form
of ownership will more likely turn against regulatory interest in times of
distress. To avoid this, ownership restrictions may be desirable from the
point  of  view  of  regulators.  This  holds  particularly  for  management
ownership shares that are large in percentage terms relative to the banks
total capital, but also the manager’s total wealth. Due to the sensitivity of
ownership regulation in a free market economy, an alternative to outright
ownership restrictions would be a more aggressive regulatory regime for
banks with concentrated ownership. From a social welfare point of view,
what has been said about the cooperative form is true about ownership
structure: the reduction of shareholder vigilance is to some extent positive
in banks.
b) Management  compensation  contracts.  Also  the  contract  between
shareholder and management can lead to excessive incentives to take on
risks. In the mainstream corporate governance literature, it is accepted that
managerial risk-aversion represents a potential agency problem between
shareholders, who are only interested in market risk, and managers, who
are interested in firm-specific risk. Management remuneration contracts
specifying  performance-based  awards  should  stretch  the  cash  flows
associated with these awards over time in order to make sure that failed
gamble for resurrection strategies are not rewarded. Regulators, who in
many countries get to have a say in bank management nominations in the
first place, should also be able to ratify payment terms, at least in the form
of spelling out guidelines to acceptable bank management remuneration
contracts.
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a) Access to the board of directors: I claim in the paper that bank regulation
shares  characteristics  with  debt  governance  as  for  example  practiced
between German banks and large firms, where bankers often have a board
mandate to step in during times of financial distress. Regulators should not
have  a permanent  board  mandate,  but  in  times  of  deteriorating  bank
quality,  they  should  be  in  a position  to  ratify  shareholder  initiated
restructuring proposals after checking for risk compatibility
112. In weaker
banks, regulators may even initiate restructurings. This would be akin to
the role of creditors in Chapter 11 or out-of-court restructurings.
b) At  the  beginning  signs  of  trouble,  regulators  should  also  be  able  to
propose, later mandate, financial institution mergers to decentralize the
restructuring process if necessary.
c) Finally,  I argue  that  Charter  Value  is  viewed  positively  by  both
shareholders and regulators. While bank regulation should not attempt to
create charter value, it may contemplate to reward it.
The  resulting  regime  avoids  some  pitfalls  of  some  calls  for  mandatory
requirements  of  market  monitoring  as  part  of  the  third  pillar  of  bank
regulation  under  Basle  II.  The  anticipated  self-selection  mechanism
appropriately  resembles  a market  structure  embedded  in  an  incentive
mechanism  that  reflects  regulatory  priorities.  The  resulting  governance
regime for banks avoids confrontational while stressing compatible debt and
equity interests.
The final result to be achieved with a structure as the one proposed here is an
efficient  financial  sector,  in  which  managers,  guided  by  the  principal  of
shareholder value maximization and constrained by regulatory risk concerns,
would adapt structures and policies of financial institutions in a way that
serves their financial clientele best.
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